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Abstract
FORETELL: Aggregating Distributed,
Heterogeneous Information from Diverse Sources
Using Market-based Techniques
Janyl Jumadinova, M.S., Ph.D
University of Nebraska, 2013
Advisor: Prithviraj Dasgupta
Predicting the outcome of uncertain events that will happen in the future
is a frequently indulged task by humans while making critical decisions.
The process underlying this prediction and decision making is called in-
formation aggregation, which deals with collating the opinions of different
people, over time, about the future event’s possible outcome. The in-
formation aggregation problem is non-trivial as the information related
to future events is distributed spatially and temporally, the information
gets changed dynamically as related events happen, and, finally, people’s
opinions about events’ outcomes depends on the information they have
access to and the mechanism they use to form opinions from that in-
formation. This thesis addresses the problem of distributed information
aggregation by building computational models and algorithms for differ-
ent aspects of information aggregation so that the most likely outcome of
future events can be predicted with utmost accuracy. We have employed
a commonly-used market-based framework called a prediction market to
formally analyze the process of information aggregation. The behavior of
humans performing information aggregation within a prediction market is
implemented using software agents which employ sophisticated algorithms
to perform complex calculations on behalf of the humans, to aggregate
information efficiently. We have considered five different yet crucial prob-
lems related to information aggregation, which include: (i) the effect of
variations in the parameters of the information being aggregated, such as
its reliability, availability, accessibility, etc., on the predicted outcome of
the event, (ii) improving the prediction accuracy by having each human
(software-agent) build a more accurate model of other humans’ behavior
in the prediction market, (iii) identifying how various market parameters
effect its dynamics and accuracy, (iv) applying information aggregation to
the domain of distributed sensor information fusion, and, (v) aggregating
information on an event while considering dissimilar, but closely-related
events in different prediction markets. We have verified all of our pro-
posed techniques through analytical results and experiments while using
commercially available data from real prediction markets within a sim-
ulated, multi-agent based prediction market. Our results show that our
proposed techniques for information aggregation perform more efficiently
or comparably with existing techniques for information aggregation using
prediction markets.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Forecasting the outcome of events that will happen in the future is an essential task
in decision-making processes. Forecasting is especially difficult since the information
related to future events frequently appears in bits and pieces, for example, as dis-
persed opinions, insights, and intuitions of people. Each person only knows a little
but possible useful piece of information, and aggregating the dispersed information
together may make considerable contribution to the decision making process. This
is encountered in various domains such as forecasting the outcome of geo-political
events, betting on the outcome of sports events, forecasting the prices of financial
instruments such as stocks, and casual predictions of entertainment events. The un-
certainty of the event changes as time goes by and new information related either
directly or indirectly to the event becomes available. Also, with the number of dif-
ferent data sources and forms exploding, the age of “Big Data” has arrived; bringing
with it challenges of analyzing the large amounts of data from various domains such
as social networks, sensor networks, and healthcare, and making decisions based on
2it. Therefore, how to aggregate vast amounts of dispersed information timely for
useful decision making is a crucial task.
1.1 Motivation
There are various forecasting methods that have been developed over the past decades.
These methods can be roughly divided into statistical and non-statistical methods [16].
Statistical methods, such as econometric models and some machine learning tech-
niques, require some historical data. The limitation of statistical methods is that in
addition to requiring the existence of enough historical data, they also require that
historical data contain valuable information about the future event. On the other
hand, non-statistical methods frequently rely on experts’ judgment and opinions.
The limitation of non-statistical methods is that in order to elicit experts’ opinions
we have to identify experts, have them agree to participate, and determine how to
combine different opinions when experts are in disagreement. All of these tasks are
complex in their own way.
The reliability of collective decision making has been of substantial interest for
a long time. In 1906 British scientist Francis Galton attended a weight judging
competition at Plymouth. Almost eight hundred people estimated the weight of an
ox. Some of the participants were experts at judging the weight of cattle (butchers,
farmers), while others only used their intuition with no insider knowledge of cattle.
Surprisingly enough for Galton, the mean estimate, which can be interpreted as the
collective wisdom of the Plymouth crowd, was very accurate. Galton’s experience
suggests that under some circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent and even
smarter than the smartest people in them. In 2005 James Surowiecki coined the
term the “wisdom of crowds” by describing how groups of people solve, under cer-
tain conditions, complex problems far better than single individuals [102]. There are
3Figure 1.1: Prediction markets use the wisdom of the crowd and the market-based
structure to predict the outcomes of unknown events.
various ways to utilize the wisdom of crowds such as using wikis, reputation systems,
or polling mechanisms. Another way to aggregate dispersed information is by setting
up a market. Economists have long understood that, in theory, the market prices
in properly designed markets reflect the collection of all the information possessed
by all the traders about future events [94]. Over the past few years, a market-based
paradigm, called prediction markets, has emerged as an attractive market mechanism
to solve forecasting problem using the aggregated opinions of the market’s partici-
pants. A prediction market consists of human traders that bet their money on the
possible future outcome of real-world events. The amount of money betted by a
trader on a particular event depends on the trader’s current belief about the outcome
of the event. The aggregate value of the monetary bets made by different traders on
an event dynamically determines the price of future bets related to the event. Pre-
diction markets are considered to be an efficient aggregation mechanism for public
opinion on the event because the dynamic price fluctuations of the bets related to an
event is claimed to be an indicator of the public opinion or belief about the outcome of
the event [109]. Its success is evidenced from the successful predictions of actual events
4done by prediction markets run by the Iowa Electronic Marketplace(IEM) [42], Trade-
sports, Hollywood Stock Exchange, the Gates-Hillman market [83], and by companies
such as Hewlett Packard, Google [23] and Yahoo!. The effectiveness of prediction mar-
kets was further confirmed during the 2012 presidential election; they were much more
effective than polls in predicting the vote shares of President Barack Obama and Gov.
Mitt Romney. Prediction markets were initially introduced as social research tools
for aggregating the opinions of a large number of people on the future outcome of im-
minent events. The following success of prediction markets as an effective aggregator
of public opinion has led to their adoption in various domains ranging from academic
research to commercial betting markets for popular events and predicting the per-
formance or sales of products by software companies. Figure 1.1 shows some of the
events that prediction markets have been used to predict. Although the concept of
prediction markets originated from financial markets, ongoing research on this topic
has evolved beyond purely market-oriented aspects into using prediction markets as
an information aggregation and decision making mechanism.
Prediction markets have many advantages over statistical or non-statistical fore-
casting methods. Compared with statistical forecasting methods, prediction markets
can incorporate real-time information, which was not contained in historical data.
Compared with non-statistical forecasting methods, prediction markets are less con-
strained by space and time since there is no need to identify experts and solicit their
participation, and hence are often less expensive in practice, and they do not need to
deal with conflicting opinions. More importantly, prediction markets can potentially
make real-time predictions that take advantage of the dispersed information, which
are sometimes hard to capture using other forecasting methods.
51.2 Thesis Objectives
Despite the advantages and recent popularity of prediction markets, understanding
and explaining the behavior of prediction markets and how to design effective pre-
diction markets are still open questions to a large extent. If prediction markets are
to be used to assist in making critical decisions in the real world, investigating these
questions is imperative. The goal of this thesis is to provide an understanding of
the properties and performance of prediction markets, through rigorous theoretical
and empirical examinations, and to obtain an initial framework to guide prediction
market design and development for decision making. To do this, we divide the thesis
into five distinct contributions.
Next, we discuss the main contributions of this thesis.
1. Analyzing the Effect of Information Related Parameters on Prediction
Markets. The first contribution is a multi-agent system that is used to analyze the
effect of information on the prediction market performance. The effect of information
on prediction markets is a crucial factor that affects the behavior of the trading
agents in the market. Information about an event that the trading agents receive also
influences the prices corresponding to the event and finally determines the outcome
of the event. Our multi-agent based system incorporates different information-related
aspects including the arrival rate of the information, the reliability of the information,
the penetration or accessibility of the information among the different trades and the
perception or impact of the information by the trading agents. The multi-agent
implementation of a prediction market allows us to easily analyze and verify the
trading agents’ behavior while varying different market and agent related internal
parameters of the prediction market, as well as external parameters related to the
information about events arriving at the market.
2. Analyzing the Behavior of the Trading Agents. Researchers have
proposed theoretical models capturing individual aspects of prediction markets such
6as utility theory-based models for participants’ behavior, or aggregation strategies for
combining the information from the market’s participants [13;18;81]. However, behav-
ior of the prediction market’s participants on the market’s predicted outcome in a
partially unknown environment has not yet been fully investigated. For the second
contribution we address this deficit by developing a game theoretic representation
of the trading agents’ interaction and determining their strategic behavior using the
equilibrium outcome of the game. We also consider risk preferences of the agents and
show theoretical properties for truthful revelation from risk averse agents. We empir-
ically compare this equilibrium trading strategy with five different trading strategies
used in similar markets with a detailed commercially available data from the Intrade
prediction market [51] that contains time-stamped information on individual trades
of each trader buying and selling securities as well as on traders’ volume and their
duration in the prediction market.
3. Analyzing the Dynamics of the Prediction Market. Despite a growing
research on prediction markets, their implementation in practice is still difficult. It is
important to know under what conditions the prediction market becomes most effi-
cient. As the third contribution we focus on the dynamics of prediction markets under
various conditions using Boolean Network techniques. Using a Boolean Network and
a mean-field approaches from statistical physics we generate a mathematical model
for a prediction market. In our model one node represents the market maker, that
at each time step aggregates the information from the other nodes in the system,
that represent the trading agents. Then, using the tools from dynamical systems and
chaos theory [? ], we analyze the evolution of the aggregated information under various
scenarios.
4. A Prediction Market used for Decision Making in Multi-Sensor Do-
main. For the fourth contribution we study a decision making setting that uses
a prediction market framework. Accurate information aggregation about uncertain
7events is very important for a decision maker. Within the last decade, much em-
pirical and analytical work on prediction markets has shown prediction markets to
be a successful information aggregation mechanism. We consider an analogous prob-
lem of information fusion from multiple sensors of different types with the objective
of improving the confidence of inference tasks, such as object classification. We de-
velop a multi-agent prediction market-based technique to solve this information fusion
problem. We experimentally verify our technique using simulations of multi-sensor
information fusion for an automated landmine detection scenario.
5. Distributed Prediction Markets. For the fifth contribution we consider a
novel, yet practical setting of prediction markets called distributed prediction mar-
kets, where the predicted outcome of an event in one prediction market is affected
dynamically by the predicted outcome of similar events in other, simultaneously run-
ning prediction markets. We focus on the problem of decision making facing a mar-
ket maker to determine the possible outcome of an event within such a setting. We
propose a formal framework based on graphical games to model the distributed pre-
diction market setting and to capture the local interactions between multiple market
makers. We also develop an algorithm that determines the best action for the par-
ticipants in the prediction market using our proposed model. Our results show that
our agent-based distributed prediction market technique operates more efficiently and
accurately than individually-operating, isolated prediction markets in predicting the
event’s outcome. Table 1.1 shows the specific research questions that we address in
each of our contributions. We investigate these questions from four approaches: theoretical
examination, empirical analysis, and design and development. Theoretical examination can
help us understand how and why prediction markets behave a certain way. This is achieved
through developing and analyzing computational models of prediction markets. Empirical
analysis using some real-world data and theoretical models aims at analyzing the behav-
ior of prediction markets. Based on previous results, we then investigate issues of design
and development of information aggregation system for decision making using prediction
8Contr. Research Question Research Approach
1 How do changes in different aspects Empirical Analysis
of information affect the behavior of
prediction markets?
2 How do different trading agent behaviors Empirical Analysis
affect the behavior of prediction markets?
2 What trading strategies perform the Empirical Analysis
best in prediction markets?
2 How can prediction markets incentivize Theoretical Examination
trading agents to participate in order to
achieve a higher prediction accuracy?
2 How does the trader’s behavior using Empirical Analysis
a formal game-theoretic model
compare to the trader’s behavior
in real prediction markets?
3 How does a prediction market evolve Theoretical Examination
and what are its dynamics under different Empirical Analysis
market and trader conditions?
3 How can we make a prediction market Theoretical Examination
unaffected by “noise”? Empirical Analysis
4 How can prediction markets be used for Design and Development
decision making? Theoretical Examination
4 Is there an advantage of using prediction Empirical Analysis
markets for sensor fusion?
4 Can a prediction market-based model for
sensor fusion be effective in realistic Empirical Analysis
settings given various limitations?
5 How can we design a distributed Theoretical Examination
model of a prediction market Design and Development
to be used for decision making?
5 Is our distributed model of the prediction Theoretical Examination
market incentive compatible?
5 How does a distributed information Theoretical Examination
aggregation in a prediction market Empirical Analysis
compare to the centralized aggregation?
Table 1.1: Research questions that are addressed in this thesis.
market.
91.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is structured in six chapters. Chapter 2 introduces basics of prediction mar-
kets and reviews related work extensively. The rest of the chapters discuss contributions 1
through 5 and answer corresponding research questions. Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of
different information related parameters on the traders’ behavior and on prediction mar-
ket’s performance. Chapter 4 studies the trading agents’ interaction and proposes an algo-
rithm for their strategic behavior. Chapter 5 studies the dynamics of prediction markets
under various conditions using Boolean Network techniques. Chapter 6 solves an informa-
tion fusion problem from multiple sensors of different types using prediction market-based
framework. Chapter 7 proposes distributed prediction markets framework where multiple
prediction markets running similar events can affect each other’s aggregated prices. And





In this chapter, we highlight the major participating entities and essential features of
the operation of a prediction market. We then summarize the related work on prediction
market.
2.1 Prediction Markets Overview
2.1.1 Prediction Market Participants and Operations
Prediction markets [109] use the collective opinions of a group of people, called the market’s
traders, to forecast the outcome of a future event. Usually, a payment mechanism with
either real or play money is used to motivate the traders to participate in the market. The
prediction market has a set of future events whose outcome has not yet been determined.
Traders bet their money on the possible future outcome of real-world events, such as the
presidential elections, some movie’s box office performance, or the sales performance of a
particular product. The amount of money betted by a trader on a particular event depends
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Figure 2.1: Essential components of a prediction market and operations of a trading
agent in a prediction market.
on the trader’s current belief about the outcome of the event. The outcome of each event
is considered as a binary variable with the outcome being 1 if the event happens and the
outcome being 0 if it does not. Each outcome of an event has a security associated with
it. A security is a specific contract that has a market price associated with it and yields
payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event. One example of a security
could be “Democratic Party candidate to win the 2016 US Presidential Election”. Securities
can be purchased or sold by traders at any time during the lifetime of the security’s event.
A security expires when the event associated with it happens at the end of the event’s
duration. At this point the outcome of the event has just been determined and all traders
are notified of the event’s outcome. The traders that had purchased the security during
the lifetime of the event then get paid a certain amount of money for every security they
possess if the event happens with an outcome of 1, or, they do not get paid anything
and lose the money they had spent on buying the security if the event happens with an
outcome of 0. During the lifetime of the event, the aggregate value of the monetary bets
made by different traders on an event dynamically determines the market price of a security
associated with the outcome of the event. The market price of a security in a prediction can
be interpreted as the probability that the event’s outcome associated with that security will
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be realized. The institution or company running the prediction market usually performs
the aggregation process and determines the market price using an intermediary called the
market maker. Traders interact with the market maker to buy and sell securities. The
market maker aggregates the prices at which traders want to trade their securities into a
single market price that represents the possible outcome of the event. Figure 2.1 shows the
main entities of a prediction market along with the operations performed by a trader in a
prediction market.
A special class of prediction markets is a combinatorial prediction market [46]. In a
combinatorial prediction market, allowable bets are not explicitly listed, but are rather
implicitly defined on a combinatorial space. For example, in a market for NBA basketball
rankings involving n teams, the outcome space might be all the n! possible permutations
of the teams. And the allowable bets could be permutations such as “Los Angeles Lakers
wins the NBA championships” or “Los Angeles Lakers beats Dallas Mavericks and Chicago
Bulls”. As another example, in a market for the state-by-state outcome (win or loss) of the
US presidential elections, the outcome space could be 250 possible state-by-state results,
while allowable bets are Boolean statements like “Obama wins in Ohio and California
but not in Nebraska”. Combinatorial prediction markets offer greater expressiveness by
being able to capture complex relationships between events. However, having to work with
a combinatorial outcome space also increases the complexity and computational cost of
predicting outcomes in a combinatorial prediction market.
2.1.2 Prediction Markets and Early Models
Prediction markets were started in 1988 at the Iowa Electronic Marketplace to investigate
whether betting on the outcome of geo-political events (e.g. outcome of presidential elec-
tions, possible outcome of international political or military crises, etc.) using real money
could elicit more accurate information about the event’s outcome than regular polls. Fol-
lowing the success of this experiment, several other prediction markets have been started in
different domains. For example, the Hollywood Stock Exchange [50] is used to predict per-
formance of movies at the box-office, Betfair [6] is used to predict the outcome of sports or
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finance-related events, while Intrade [51] is used to predict outcomes of various events rang-
ing from political to entertainment. Recently, several companies such as Google, Hewlett
Packard, Microsoft and Yahoo! have used prediction markets to analyze different technology
trends such as information processing practices in organizations and product management
strategies. In 2003, the interest in prediction markets was strong enough that a think tank
within the U.S. Department of Defense planned to establish a Policy Analysis Market where
securities corresponding to different political and geographical events could be traded.
With the successful operation of several prediction markets, researchers attempted to
make mathematical models to understand various aspects of the market’s operation. Among
the earliest research on this topic, Wolfers and Zitzewitz [109] compared forecasts made by
prediction markets in different domains such as oil markets and movie box office earnings to
show that prediction market forecasts follow other independent forecasting mechanisms very
closely. The major insights offered by their work hypothesized that prediction markets will
not perform well at predicting small probability events, that the profit motive of traders is
sufficient to prevent prediction markets from being manipulated, and, that it was important
to design the market trading rules carefully. Contrary to this result, Manski [69] concluded
that the predictions of event outcomes made in prediction markets did not closely correspond
to the actual probability beliefs of the traders in the market unless the probability is near
either 0 or 1. In response, Wolfers and Zitzewitz [111] presented empirical results showing that
prediction market prices closely track the mean beliefs of traders, providing a foundation for
the claim that predictions markets efficiently aggregate beliefs. The authors used different
mathematical belief functions to show that distributions of beliefs that are not too diverse
result in market prices that are close to the mean belief of the traders. With the support of
empirical prediction market data from U.S. election and professional football domains, the
authors concluded that Manski’s special case that showed how prices and beliefs may diverge
was not the best case scenario but, rather, a worst-case scenario. Further, Gjerstad [34]
showed that traders’ risk aversion and beliefs may significantly affect the equilibrium price.
Using the same coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) expected utility function but
independent wealth and belief distribution for the traders, Gjerstad showed that predictions
14
are typically very close to the mean belief of the traders in the market if the distribution of
beliefs is smooth and risk aversion is modeled into the traders’ behavior.
Despite encouraging results in these earlier papers motivating prediction markets, other
evidence, however, suggests that the relative performance advantage of prediction markets
may be small, and that markets may not even be the best performers. In predicting the
outcome of football games, Chen et al. reported that pooled expert assessments are com-
parable in accuracy to prediction markets [15]. Goel et al. [36] compared the performance
of prediction markets against conventional methods, i.e. polls and statistical models for
sports and entertainment domains and showed that prediction markets do not significantly
outperform the other methods. Therefore, researchers have been tackling important open
questions that help to identify conditions under which prediction markets work the best,
how they work, and how to design efficient prediction markets. We review some of these
techniques in the next section.
2.2 Prediction Market Models
In recent times, with the advent of intelligent software agents that can perform complex
computations to model the behavior of human traders in a prediction market, much of the
prediction market research has concentrated on using artificial prediction markets where
software agents mimic the functionality of human traders and market makers from a real
prediction market. Clearly, the advantage of artificial, agent-based prediction markets is
that mathematical models of trader behavior and market operation can be studied and
analyzed relatively easily by simulating the operations in the market while using data from
real prediction markets. Because of the widespread use of agent-based prediction markets,
in the remainder of this chapter we have used the terms trader and agent interchangeably
to refer to either a human trader or a software trading agent.
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2.2.1 Prediction Market Trading Protocols
Because prediction markets have their roots in financial markets, a popular protocol for
trading in financial markets called the continuous double auction (CDA) protocol, has been
used relatively extensively in early work on prediction markets [92;109]. In a CDA each
security is associated with two prices in the market - a bid price and an ask price. The bid
price is the price at which agents are willing to purchase the security and the ask price is
the price at which agents are willing to sell the security. The difference between bid price
and sell price is known as the spread. There are usually two types of orders that agents
can place, known as market orders and limit orders. Market order is an order to buy or
sell a security at the best available price and is of the form “Buy(Sell) X shares”. Market
orders are executed immediately at the prevailing market bid or ask price. Limit order
is an order to buy or sell a security at a specific price and is of the form “Buy(Sell) X
shares at price Y”. The highest buy limit order and the lowest sell limit order form the
market bid and ask prices respectively. A new market buy order is traded at the price
corresponding to the lowest limit sell order, while, a market sell order is traded at the
price corresponding to the highest limit buy order. Traditional Iowa Electronic Markets
and InTrade prediction markets use the CDA protocol. The CDA protocol offers two main
advantages over other common prediction market trading protocols. First, with CDAs,
the price of a security is allowed to make instantaneous jumps by arbitrary values. These
price jumps can immediately capture the extent of the impact of an external event or
information on a security’s price. For example, following a natural calamity affecting crude
oil production, a security corresponding to the event ’crude oil futures closing above $100
in 2013’ can go, for example, from $90 to $40 in one trade in a prediction market using
CDA. Secondly, agents using CDA are able to express their opinions precisely by placing
bid or ask orders at specific prices. In contrast, other protocols require agents to specify the
quantity they wish to trade while regulating the market price, usually through the market
maker. However, the CDA protocol has shortcomings when used in a prediction market. In
the CDA, traders reveal the prices at which they wish to trade through buy and sell orders,
and, consequently, run the risk of potentially losing profit by revealing their willingness to
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trade beforehand to other traders. Another major drawback of the CDA protocol is that it
fails to work if there is insufficient liquidity, that is, if there are very few traders who cannot
reach an agreement on a trading price, and, thus may never trade securities with each other.
Liquidity problems are most prominent in combinatorial prediction markets since they have
vast numbers of outcomes to predict. Hanson [46] proposed the use of automated market
makers within the context of combinatorial prediction markets to deal with matching and
liquidity problems using a market scoring rule, which we discuss next.
2.2.2 Automated Market Makers and Scoring Rules
Scoring rules were first proposed by Brier [11] and analyzed further by Winkler [108]. They
were initially used for forecasting weather and finance events. A scoring rule is a mathe-
matical formula that determines the payment received by an agent for its forecast for the
outcome of an event. Suppose an event e has m possible outcomes with oi representing the
i-th outcome. r =< ro1 , ro2 , ..., rom > is a reported probability estimate vector where roi
corresponds to the price that a risk-neutral trader wants to pay for securities corresponding
to outcome oi. A scoring rule S = {s1(r), s2(r), ..., sm(r)} assigns a score si(r) to a trader
who reports r if outcome oi is realized
∗. Scoring rules have been shown to elicit good
probability estimates from individual traders.
A regular scoring rule (if si(r) is finite when ri > 0) is (strictly) proper if truthful
reporting (strictly) maximizes the expected score of a risk-neutral agent, that is, given the
true belief p, where
∑
i pi = 1,
Ep(si(p)) ≥ EP (si(r)) given
∑
i
ri = 1 (2.1)
si is strictly proper if the inequality in Equation 6.8 is strict.
Hanson [46] combined features of scoring rules and prediction markets into a market
scoring rule (MSR). A special type of scoring rule called the logarithmic scoring rule
(LSR), which has been used extensively in prediction markets, deserves special mention. A
∗The specific mathematical formula for soi(r) is determined by the type of the scoring rule used,
such as, quadratic, spherical, logarithmic, etc.
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logarithmic scoring rule is defined by the following expression:
si(r) = ai + b · log(ri), (2.2)
where, si(·) is the score corresponding to the i-th outcome of an event being realized given
a report r. ai > 0 is an arbitrary parameter while b > 0 is a parameter determined by the
market maker to control its monetary risk as well as the maximum quantity of securities
that agents can buy or sell at or near the current price without causing massive price
swings. Larger values of b allow agents to trade more frequently but also increase the
market maker’s chances to lose money. The logarithmic scoring rule has some desirable
properties - it preserves the conditional independence relations∗ [47], and it is the only rule
that can be used both to reward an agent and to evaluate its performance using statistical
likelihood methods [108].
When the general logarithmic scoring rule is used sequentially by agents to calculate
their payoffs in a prediction market, the scoring rule is called the Logarithmic Market
Scoring Rule (LMSR). The LMSR gives a formula to calculate the current market price for
a small quantity (small enough so that the trade can be completed in one time period) of







where, s is the logarithmic market scoring rule vector over all possible outcomes of the
event, si ∈ S and other parameters are as defined in Equation 2.2.
A market maker using the LMSR to determine the market price in a prediction market is
called an LMSR market maker. As pointed out by Hanson [46;47], the fundamental difference
in the trading protocol using an LMSR market maker from that using a CDA is that agents
now only express quantities they wish to buy or sell at the current market price that is set
by the market maker, instead of specifying the price along with the quantity at which they
∗Placing a bet on conditional event A given eventB should not change the conditional probability
distribution of B or C for some event C that is unrelated to how event A might depend on event B
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wish to buy or sell through buy and sell orders. An LMSR market maker is a type of market
maker called a cost-function based market maker [13]. It offers m securities, one for each
possible outcome, where each security pays $1 if the corresponding outcome happens and
$0 otherwise. Let q = (q1, q2, ..., qm) denote the vector specifying the number of units of
each security held by different agents. The market maker first calculates a cost function to
reflect the total money wagered in the prediction market by the agents. Agents inform the
quantity of a security they wish to buy or sell to the market maker. If an agent purchases
δ units of a security, the market maker determines the payment the agent has to make as
C(q+ δ)−C(q). Correspondingly, if the agent sells δ quantity of the security, it receives a
payoff of C(q)− C(q− δ) from the market maker. For the LMSR market maker, the cost
and price (corresponding to outcome oi) functions are given by:










i=1 pi(q) = 1.
The LMSR market maker has been extensively used in recent prediction market re-
search [1;13;14;43;78;83;87] where it has been implemented, extended, analyzed or compared
with other market maker strategies. It is also used at several prediction markets, such as
Inkling Markets, Consensus Point, Yahoo!, Microsoft, BizPredict, and Washington Stock
Exchange. Among recent significant works on LMSR market makers, Chen and Vaughan [14]
showed that there is a one-to-one mapping between the strictly proper market scoring rules
and convex cost-function based market makers. In particular, they show that these two











where qi is the number of units of security corresponding to outcome oi that is being held by
all agents, pi is the true belief of an agent that the outcome is oi, and ∆m is the probability
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simplex that consists of all possible probability distributions for a random variable with
state space [m] = {1, 2, ...,m}. The authors’ mapping allows for an easy conversion between
market scoring rule and cost-function based market makers. They also showed that a cost-
function based market maker with bounded loss can be interpreted as a no-regret learner,
that is as learning a probability distribution over outcomes by treating each observed trade
as a training instance.
The computational complexity of an LMSR market maker has been a topic of interest in
several literature. In [17], the authors examined permutation combinatorics, where outcomes
are permutations of objects, and, Boolean combinatorics, where outcomes are combinations
of binary events, within a combinatorial prediction market. The problem of LMSR pricing in
the combinatorial prediction market was shown to be #P hard, even with severely limited
languages. They also proposed an approximation technique for pricing in combinatorial
prediction markets that is based on permutation learning technique.
One way to deal with this computational complexity is to use a restricted betting lan-
guage that limits the set of tradable securities. Guo and Pennock [43] studied combinatorial
prediction markets with an LMSR market maker where events are represented as a tree-like
hierarchy and agents can bet on the sum of values at any tree node. For example, in the US
presidential election market, the total number of electoral votes determines the outcome of
the election. The tree for this example has “Overall Election Results” as a root node and
each state’s result as a leaf node. Therefore, betting on the number of electoral votes won
by President Obama from a set of states is the same as betting on the weighted sum of
the binary variables representing those states, where weights are electoral votes of different
states. The authors proposed three expressive languages for betting on the weighted sum:
• Sum of arbitrary subset (SAS): betting on the weighted sum of an arbitrary subset
of values
• Sum of varying weights (SVW): agents set their own weights in their bets but restrict
subsets to form hierarchy
• Sum with predefined weights (SPW): betting on the weighted sum of selected subsets
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of values, where weights are predefined and subsets form a hierarchy
They further analyzed the computational complexity of each proposed language and showed
that pricing for SAS and SVW was NP-hard, but a polynomial time algorithm existed for
SPW.
Researchers have also recently identified some drawbacks of the LMSRmarket maker and
proposed alternate market making rules. Othman and Sandholm [83] ran a prediction market
with an automated market maker using LMSR to predict the opening day of the Gates and
Hillman Centers at Carnegie Mellon University. They found two flaws in LMSR automated
market maker - spikiness of prices across similar events, and, liquidity insensitivity leading
to price volatility. To fix these two problems, Othman et al. [87] introduced a modified LMSR
market maker. The authors argued that parameter b was non-trivial to set since it controlled
how quickly prices move and also the worst-case loss of the market makers. Their proposed
market maker increases b continuously with the total number of all securities purchased by
agents thereby. Thus, the modified market maker automatically adjusts how easily market
prices change according to the amount of trading in the market. The authors showed that
no market maker can satisfy three properties: (1) path independence(budget-balanced), (2)
no-arbitrage (no gain without a risk), (3) and liquidity sensitivity (small trades move market
prices less in thick(liquid) markets). They noted that an LMSR market maker satisfies the
path independence and no-arbitrage properties. They have subsequently weakened the no-
arbitrage property in the LMSR market maker and designed an automated market maker
that can run at profit.
Brahma et al. [10] evaluated two different market makers - an inventory-based logarithmic
market scoring rule (LMSR) market maker and a Bayesian market maker (BMM). The
authors used an information-based market maker model that is based on the canonical
Glosten-Milgrom model [35] of price-setting under asymmetric information. The market
maker has to set a bid (buy) price, denoted by bid, and an ask (sell) price, denoted by ask.
It does this using its beliefs about the realization of outcome oi, such that its expected
profit is non-negative. An agent receives a signal s, where the variance of s measures the
uncertainty in the agent’s signal, and trades as follows: if s < bid, the agent sells, and if
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s > ask, the agent buys. The authors found that BMM offered market price stability and
lower expected loss compared to LMSR market maker, but BMM did not guarantee bounded
loss. The authors also identified that LSMR market maker represents an uninformed agent
and may be outsmarted by human agents; BMM market maker on the other hand, is able
to handle large trades and adapt quickly to market shocks.
Dudik et al. [29] proposed a new automated market maker for providing liquidity across
multiple logically inter-related securities and propagating as much information as possi-
ble among logically related securities while keeping the pricing algorithm tractable. Their
model consists of two components. First, a large prediction market is broken into small
markets, which solves the intractability problem, but may introduce arbitrage opportuni-
ties. Secondly, a general scheme is introduced that detects and removes arbitrage based on
convex optimization and constraint generation using linear equalities and inequalities. The
authors found that their method lies between a market maker that treats related securities
as independent and unrelated, and, a full combinatorial market maker for which pricing is
computationally intractable. They also found that their market maker is competitive with
an LMSR market maker but it adds the ability to scale to exponential outcome spaces.
So far we have discussed automated market makers that satisfy some of the four proper-
ties that are desired to have in a market maker - bounded loss, the ability to make a profit,
a vanishing spread that approaches zero in the limit as volume gets large, and, unlimited
market depth, that is, the price of any fixed-size trade approaches the marginal bid or ask
price. Satisfying all four characteristics is difficult because several of the properties are con-
tradictory. For example, different variations of the LMSR market maker that we discussed
above [13;14;83] can offer bounded worst-case loss and no marginal bid/ask spread. But they
do not offer the ability for the market maker to make a profit, and they only offer a fixed
liquidity of the market, i.e. the market does not become more liquid with the increase of the
volume. Othman and Sandholm [86] presented a market maker that satisfies all four of the
desired properties. Their proposed market maker extends the constant-utility cost function
market maker [13] with two separate functions, liquidity and profit, that are added to the
market prices that are quoted to the agent. The liquidity function uses its gains to increase
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the amount of liquidity provided by the market maker, while the profit function represents
a “lockbox” of savings that is separate from the rest of the market maker’s decision-making
process. For most of the market makers in the literature, including the LMSR market
maker, an agent can buy and then immediately sell a security from the market maker at
no cost. The authors showed that real markets do not generally function this way because
an agent that buys and then immediately sells a security from the market maker will en-
counter a loss. Their proposed market maker imitates real world market makers in their
path dependence. The authors provide the complete set of conditions that are required for
different parts of their automated market maker along with several examples of functions
that satisfy this set of conditions, noting that any mix of these examples will produce an
automated market maker with certain desirable qualities.
2.2.3 Dynamic Parimutuel Markets
Complementary to using MSRs, Pennock [91] proposed another model for prediction markets,
called a dynamic parimutuel market (DPM). Under this model, which is similar to horse
race betting, market liquidity is automatically created by allowing all agents to purchase any
security at any time. There are m securities in a DPM, each corresponding to one outcome.
The agents that participated in the prediction market split the total pool of money at the
end of the prediction market in proportion to the amount they have put in. The agents
are allowed to see the securities they hold before the outcome is known since the market
price of a single security varies dynamically according to a price function. DPM acts as an
automated market maker similar to the cost-function based market maker, except that the
payoff of a security is not fixed.










The payoff of a security, corresponding to outcome oi when outcome oi happens and q is
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Unlike a regular parimutuel market, in Pennock’s DPM, agents are allowed to trade their
previous investments using a continuous double auction (CDA) protocol. However, such
trading occurs at a heavily discounted market price. This creates considerable (monetary)
risk for agents to invest in bad securities. Thus a DPM makes rational agents inherently
risk-averse or risk-neutral, which makes prediction markets operate more efficiently.
Recently, there has been some interest in comparing and unifying market scoring rules
and DPM mechanisms for prediction markets. Nikolova and Sami [78] developed a new
abstract betting game, called the segment game. A segment game can serve as a strategic
model of DPMs, and can also model the strategies in market scoring rules. The segment
game is tractable to analyze, and has an attractive geometric visualization that makes the
strategic moves and interactions more transparent. The authors used their segment game to
prove several strategic properties about the dynamic parimutuel market. They also proved
that a special form of the segment game is strategically equivalent to the spherical scoring
rule, and, strategically similar to other scoring rules.
2.3 Models for Overall Prediction Market Behav-
ior
Trading protocols in prediction markets which were reviewed in the previous section specify
rules for determining trading prices by the traders or by the market maker. In parallel,
some recent work on prediction markets analyzes the market’s overall price dynamics while
using the trading protocols mentioned earlier. One of the earliest computational models
of a prediction market [32] used a Shapley-Shubik game to formally represent the market’s
interactions. In the Shapley-Shubik model trading occurs in rounds and each agent must
offer at least one security for sale with no restrictions on credit. The market price of a
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security at the end of each round is determined by averaging the bids over the number of
agents. Agents bid for securities on each round and agents are always assumed to reveal
their true preferences. The authors found that good predictions depend on some knowledge
of the market by the agents but knowledge alone is not sufficient. Instead, they argued that
the prediction market structure that affects how private information is shared is important
and the design of prediction markets that converge to direct communication equilibrium
are an important research topic. Chen et al. [16] generalized the Shapley-Shubik game based
model to allow for aggregate uncertainty, which occurs when the state of the world is not
known even after all agents have shared their information. Their work addresses different
properties related to the market equilibrium in prediction markets such as convergence to
a consensus equilibrium, the rate of convergence, identifying the best possible equilibrium,
and, whether a prediction market is guaranteed to converge to the best possible equilibrium.
Section 2.4 also describes various models that were developed to study the behavior of
the agents and their effect on the prediction market.
2.4 Traders: Behavior and Strategies
There have been a number of prediction market studies that analyzed real prediction market
data to identify some properties of the behavior of the agents in prediction markets. For
example, Cowgill et al. [23] analyzed the trade data from internal prediction markets at
Google. While other companies have created such markets, the Google markets were the
largest such experiment at the time. The study had the advantage of having trade-by-trade
data and short-lived markets. 157 different markets were analyzed and all had the common
characteristic of representing outcomes that had a direct impact on Google. Measures of
geographical, organizational, and social proximity and demographic similarity were used to
study trading behavior and to investigate correlations in information and opinion. These
measures were used in a regression model designed to predict the differences in the holdings
of individual agents after each trade. The prior positions of colleagues were used to predict
the size and direction of each trade. The authors found that the agents tended to be most
25
optimistic about subjects over which they had some control, such as completing a project
on time or whether a particular office would be opened. Their results also suggest that
micro-geography played an important role in the flow of market information - trades of
physically proximate employees were correlated after the employees began to sit next to
each other. And finally, work history and organizational proximity played lesser roles while
social connections and demographics had little explanatory power.
Another aspect investigated by researchers is whether agents in a prediction market
respond to play money in the same manner they do to real money. To investigate this,
Servan-Schreiber et al. [98] conducted an online experiment comparing the predictions of
TradeSports.com (real money) against predictions of NewsFutures.com (play money) re-
garding American Football outcomes during the 2003 − 2004 NFL season. The authors
suggested that real-money markets may better motivate information discovery while play-
money markets may yield more efficient information aggregation.
There have also been a lot of theoretical studies on the behavior of the agents in pre-
diction markets. For example, Othman and Sandholm [85] studied the behavior of simple
agents and how their behavior affect market prices over time. They considered two models:
adversarial ordering model and random ordering model. They used a pricing rule that de-
fines a structured way of adjusting prices in response to instantaneous aggregate demand.
They assumed that the market maker’s pricing rule is a strictly increasing function, which
is history independent. They also assumed that the simple agents have fixed beliefs, fixed
budget, participate only once and sequentially interact with an automated market maker.
They found that under the adversarial ordering model, market prices can be arbitrarily
uninformative and show that final market prices diverge arbitrarily based on the order
of agent participation, while under random ordering model market prices are informative.
They proved their results for two agents and then for a countable set of agents. Their results
suggest that a market can become unhinged - as a failure of the 1996 Iowa Electronic Mar-
ket vote-share market, and agent ordering has the greatest potential of skewing the market
prices at the end of trading. This work, however, assumed that agents are myopic and
risk-neutral. These assumptions have been relaxed in other literature, which are discussed
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next. account.
2.4.1 Incentive Compatibility and Bluffing
Hanson [46] has shown that, for risk-neutral agents that are myopic (i.e., do not account for
the effect of their trades on other agents), it is optimal for each agent to reveal its true
beliefs of the outcome of the traded event in a market scoring rule-based prediction market.
This result leads to two questions: 1) What happens when agents take into account future
payoffs, i.e. when they are non-myopic? 2) What happens when agents are not risk-neutral?
The first question is addressed in Chen et al. [18], where the authors studied whether there
exists game-theoretic equilibria at which agents reveal their truthful information quickly (as
soon as they can). They considered one event in a prediction market with two outcomes
using an LMSR market maker and risk-neutral agents. They modeled such a prediction
market as an n-player, incomplete-information, dynamic game. At the beginning of their
prediction market each agent i gets a private signal si. The joint distribution of si’s and
the outcome of the event is common knowledge. Agents trade in the prediction market
according to a predefined sequence. The authors analyzed two scenarios: when agents have
conditionally independent signals and when agents have unconditionally independent sig-
nals. Agents’ signals are conditionally independent when their observations are independent
given the true state of the world. For example, signals are conditionally independent in the
prediction market trying to predict whether a product was manufactured with high quality
materials or low quality materials. Signals are uncondionally independent when signals may
influence the outcome of the event, but are not caused by the true state of the world. For ex-
ample, signals are unconditionally independent in a presidential election prediction market.
The authors showed that the truthful strategy is an equilibrium strategy when agents have
conditionally independent signals, and, a mixed strategy of bluffing with a certain probabil-
ity is an equilibrium strategy, when agents have unconditionally independent signals, where
bluffing is the strategy of betting contrary to one’s information in order to deceive future
agents, with the intent of gaining profits on their resultant misinformed trading.
Jian and Sami [53] extended the work in [18] by conducting experiments with humans to
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study the speed and efficiency of information aggregation. They compared two market scor-
ing rules - direct [46;47], where agents report their beliefs as probabilities, and, indirect [13],
where agents reveal their beliefs through buying and selling. They found that the informa-
tion is better aggregated in the experiments when the trading sequence is prespecified. They
also found that under the assumption of a pre-specified trading sequence, agent behaviors
are different under the two information structures - conditionally independent signals and
unconditionally independent signals. When the trading sequence is prespecified there are
more manipulative behaviors with unconditionally independent signals than with condition-
ally independent signals, while this difference is not found without the prespecified trading
sequence.
It was assumed in [18;53] that the agents are myopic, however strategic agents will not
always behave myopically as they may try to manipulate the beliefs of the other agents, and
therefore, the market price in order to make extra profit. Conitzer [22] explored strategic
aspects of prediction markets through their analogy to mechanism design. He observed
that market scoring rules only incentivize agents to report their beliefs truthfully if they
are myopic, but with non-myopic agents truthful revelation cannot be guaranteed. He
proposed that mechanism design was an appropriate technique to solve this problem since
direct-revelation mechanisms that are incentive-compatible to agents do not give agents
any incentive to misreport their private information (beliefs). The author acknowledged
that direct-revelation prediction markets are not very practical, but argued for the need
of a mechanism design-based prediction market model. He proposed a sample mechanism
comprising of information agents, that have relevant information about the event, but not
necessarily able to convert this information into a probability, and, probability agents, that
do not necessarily have any information about the event, but are able to convert any given
information to a probability. The proposed mechanism uses information agents to compute
conditional probability of an event happening and then it uses the probability agents to get
estimates of these conditional probabilities using standard prediction market.
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2.4.2 Risk Behavior
Dimitrov et al. [28] tackled the second question: What happens when agents are not risk-
neutral? In practice, most people are better modeled as being risk-averse in their decision
making. They modeled agents as expected-utility maximizers with an arbitrary weakly
monotone and concave utility function that captures their risk aversion. The authors focused
on a general setting in which agents have unknown risk aversion, and study whether it
is possible to guarantee myopic truthfulness while preserving other desirable properties
of prediction markets. They specified that any prediction market-like mechanism should
satisfy the following properties:
• myopic strategyproofness, giving agents no incentive to report untruthfully,
• sequential trade, giving agents the opportunity to update beliefs,
• a variant of sybilproofness, capturing the idea that trading under multiple identities
does not yield any direct advantage
• boundedness of the expected subsidy.
They proposed one mechanism that satisfies all of these properties, even with the agents that
have unknown risk-averse preferences. The key building block of their result is a technique
of scoring agents by varying their probability of winning a fixed reward. However, the
mechanism has the undesirable property that expected profits decrease exponentially as
the number of agents grows, and moreover, they proved that this is unavoidable in the
context of mechanisms for arbitrarily risk-averse agents.
Iyer et al. [52] studied a setting where there are n risk-averse agents with conditionally
independent private signals that participate in the prediction market with an automated
market maker. They identified a condition called smoothness requirement under which a
prediction market will aggregate the private information of rational risk-averse agents. The
smoothness condition requires that there is no bid-ask spread for buying or selling a small
quantity of any security. They showed that if the securities held by the agents converged over
time, and the limiting market price charged by the market maker is continuously differen-
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tiable at zero with respect to the quantity traded, then the prediction market will aggregate
information at any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The authors proved that if the sig-
nal space is finite, then in any pure strategy PBE that satisfies asymptotic smoothness and
bounded loss, prediction market aggregates information of the agents. The authors found
that the market prices in general are not equal to the posterior state distribution because
market prices must also reflect the risk aversion of the agents, i.e. the marginal expected
utility of the agents. But they showed that when there is at least one risk-neutral agent
in the prediction market along with risk-averse agents, the market prices are equal to the
posterior probability. Although, the authors characterized conditions for full information
aggregation at PBEs, the existence of such equilibria is still an open question.
2.5 Prediction Market for Decision Making
The work surveyed in this chapter so far has implicitly assumed that trading agents can
not take actions to influence the outcome of the event. This is often not true in the real
world. For example, with an internal prediction market to predict a software delivery date, a
developer of the software who purchases securities in the prediction market may deliberately
take actions outside of the prediction market to affect the software delivery date so that
the securities he buys will pay off. Hanson [46] and Berg and Rietz [5] first hinted on the
idea that prediction markets can be used as decision support systems, calling such markets
decision markets. Once incorporated into the decision making process, prediction markets
often unintentionally create incentives for trading agents to manipulate the market price.
An emerging line of research has studied incentive issues that arise when using prediction
markets for decision making.
Othman and Sandholm [84] looked at information elicitation from one agent by the de-
cision maker. In their setting the decision maker chooses an action from a set of possible
actions, D = {d1, ..., dk}, in order to maximize the probability of achieving a desirable
outcome oi, which could for example be “product launch by the beginning on 2013”. The
decision maker asks an agent to tell him the probability of achieving the outcome oi under
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each of the alternative actions. Based on the agent’s report, the decision maker makes his
decision. The agent is risk-neutral and does not care which action is taken or whether the
outcome oi is achieved, it just cares about its payoff and how its payoff gets affected. To
encourage an agent to submit an accurate probability, the decision maker pays the agent
using a scoring rule.
The authors showed that there does not exist any strictly proper scoring rule and de-
cision rule pair. They then created an asymmetric quasi-strictly proper rule for the max
decision rule, wheremax decision rule is the rule that allows the decision maker to select the
action that has the highest reported probability of achieving the desired outcome and where
ties are broken in some fixed way. The rule is called a quasi-strictly proper rule if, given
agent’s true belief p = (p1, ..., pk), dj - the action taken by the deterministic decision rule
D, and u(p) - the agent’s expected utility from reporting p given the decision rule/scoring
rule pair, u(p) ≥ u(p′), u(p) > u(pj), ∀p′ 6= p and where pj represents any report for which
the jth component does not equal pj (that is, the agent does not report P (oi|dj) truthfully).
The authors have shown that in a decision making prediction market with multiple agents,
the agents always have an incentive to manipulate using the standard scoring rules. They
proposed a family of new scoring rules that reduces the possibility of manipulation.
Chen and Kash [12] expanded Othman and Sandholm’s work in [84]. They used the same
model but they allowed randomized decision rules and considered multiple possible out-
comes, instead of just two outcomes. Their main theorem provides a simple test to de-
termine whether the scoring rule is proper for an arbitrary decision rule and scoring rule
pair and generalizes result in [84] by characterizing all (strictly) proper scoring rules for all
decision rules. The authors also discussed how the elicitation problem becomes more com-
plicated when there are multiple agents; while strictly proper scoring rules can be used
for a single agent and extended to prediction markets with multiple agents, these scoring
and decision rule pairs do not have a such a natural extension. In particular, the authors
identified two main problems. First of all, an agent has to base its decisions on beliefs about
what the final market probabilities would be since only one decision is made in the end.
Secondly, scoring rules that encourage truthful revelation no longer have the same effect in
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this situation since no individual agent controls the final decision.
Thus to combat these problems, in [19] the authors characterized all scoring rules incen-
tivizing a single risk-neutral agent to report truthfully given a decision rule. They intro-
duced myopic incentive-compatible decision markets. Unlike previously proposed models of
decision markets, the authors calculated the payoff for agents using a decision scoring rule
instead of a standard scoring rule. They found that when a decision maker risks taking an
action at random, these decision scoring rules allow the rewards of unlikely actions to be
increased and the rewards of likely actions are comparatively reduced, making risk-neutral
agents indifferent to their effect on the decision. The authors also found that the risk of
taking an action at random is necessary for myopic incentive-compatible decision markets,
and reducing this risk increases the decision maker’s worst-case loss.
Shi, Conitzer, and Guo [99] examined settings where agents participating in a prediction
market may also have an ability to influence the outcome. Their setting comprises of a
principal (i.e. the company) that sets up a prediction market and has a preference over
the event outcomes (i.e. on-time delivery of the software), and, a group of agents that
has information about the event of interest and can take actions to affect the outcome.
The authors characterized all principal-aligned proper scoring rules that do not incentivize
agent to take any action that may harm the principal in expectation. They showed an
overpayment result, which roughly states that with n agents, any prediction mechanism
that is principal-aligned will, in the worst case, require the principal to pay Θ(n) times
as much as a prediction market. However, in this work, unlike works in [12;84], the elicited
information is not explicitly used for decision making.
Boutilier [9] continued the study of realistic settings, in which the decision maker takes
an action based on the agent’s belief and the agent has an inherent interest in the decision,
by presenting a formal model of scoring rules, in the form of compensation functions, that
incentivize truthful reporting even when agents have an interest in the actions taken by the
decision maker. Unlike any of the previous works, Boutilier explicitly modeled the decision
maker’s policy, utility, or loss in case of manipulation, and considered agent’s utility apart
from the payoff offered by the market maker. By analyzing a single agent setting, Boutilier
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found that the agent does not need to know the decision maker’s policy prior to reporting its
probabilities as long as it can verify which action has been taken after the fact and that the
decision maker cannot ensure truthful reporting without full knowledge of the agent’s utility
function. However, in a multiple agent setting, he noted that more development needs to
be done to make compensation rules applicable to and practical in prediction markets.
The incentives for the trading agents to manipulate the market price in a prediction
market used for decision making can take the form of the potential to profit in a subsequent
market. Dimitrov and Sami [27] examined incentive problems when there are two prediction
markets for two different but related events. They showed that this situation might cause
an agent to report sub-optimally in one market to mislead the agent in another market, and,
that the information revealed and agent’s payoffs in equilibrium are uniquely determined,
and consistent with a minimax strategy profile. Chen et al. [20] extended the work in [27]
with the outside incentives being of a general form of any monotone function of the final
market price instead of the form of the potential profit in a second market used in [27].
They found that, for the case when the first agent has the outside payoff with probability
1, i.e. when the existence of the outside incentives to manipulate the market price is
certain and common knowledge, in many cases there exists a separating equilibrium for the
market where information is fully aggregated. They also showed that, for case when the
probability for the first agent to have the outside payoff is less than 1, i.e. the existence
of outside incentives is uncertain, there exists no separating or semi-separating equilibrium
where information is fully aggregated if the outside incentive is sufficiently large.
2.6 Application Domains of Prediction Markets
Up to now, we have reviewed various mathematical and computational models for predic-
tion markets where the main objective is to aggregate the traders’ information to forecast
the outcome of a future event or to make decisions. In contrast, some recent work has
applied prediction markets to various domains beyond event outcome forecasting and de-
cision making. In [31], a Turing Trade was created, which was a Web-based game that was
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a hybrid of a prediction market and a Turing test. Turing Trade allowed the users to buy
securities (place bets) on whether they are talking to a human or a computer. The results
were then analyzed quantitatively to determine how human-like a particular bot is. In a
Turing Trade, a group of agents conversed with a single target. Each individual agent in the
group could ask the target public questions, and the target gave public answers. During the
conversation, all agents in the group participated in the prediction market, where the single
binary event that the judges were trying to predict was “the target will be revealed to be a
human.” They were doing this by buying and selling securities using points, not real money.
At the end of the game, the target’s true nature (human or computer) was revealed, and
based on this outcome some of the securities paid out. About 900 games of Turing Trade
were played and the authors were able to collect large quantities of fine-grained data and to
introduce a novel, fast-paced prediction market. By analyzing the data collected from the
Turing Trade games, the authors found that Turing Trade produced very strong and accu-
rate predictions after short periods of time, and that the market price responded rapidly to
good or bad answers by the target.
Ellis and Sami [30] used a prediction market to supplement classroom learning. The
authors carried out a quasi-experiment in an introductory political science class at the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor by creating 12 prediction markets with MSR market
makers that were relevant to the topic of the course. The purpose of the study was to
analyze the effect of prediction markets on student engagement with the course material.
After analyzing their data, the authors concluded that an elective upper-level undergraduate
course or a graduate course may be more appropriate settings for using prediction markets
as an educational tool.
Pfeiffer and Almenberg [93] discussed the benefits of using prediction markets for biomed-
ical research through an example application in the context of decision making in research
on the genetics of diseases. When researchers investigate gene-disease associations the case-
control studies are very useful, where a case-control study a group of patients that have
been diagnosed with a disease is matched with a healthy control group, and the researchers
then estimate whether a particular genetic marker is more frequent in one of the two groups.
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The authors argue that prediction markets could be used to obtain prior probabilities for
the association between genetic markers and the disease. The authors also discussed that
prediction markets have a potential to improve the performance of not only biomedical
research, but a general scientific research as well, by examining the ways to link prediction
markets with scientific publishing.
Barbu and Lay [4] introduced a mathematical theory of simulating prediction markets
numerically for the purpose of supervised learning of probability estimators. They presented
a novel method for fusing the prediction information of features or trained classifiers, where
the fusion result is the market price of the securities corresponding to the possible outcomes.
They have shown that their obtained artificial prediction market is a maximum likelihood
estimator and that artificial prediction market generalizes linear aggregation, logistic re-
gression and even some kernel methods. The authors conducted experiments, where they
compared the artificial prediction markets with other estimators, and their results showed
that the artificial prediction markets often outperform random forest and implicit online
learning on synthetic data and real datasets.
In the following chapters we present our contributions in solving open problems related
to different aspects of prediction markets.
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Chapter 3
Analyzing the Effect of
Information on Prediction Markets
Information about an event that the trading agents receive affects their belief values about
the outcome of an event, influences the prices corresponding to the event and finally deter-
mines the outcome of the event. Therefore, it makes sense to analyze the behavior of the
trading agents in response to different information-related parameters in a prediction mar-
ket. We develop a multi-agent based system that incorporates different information-related
aspects including the arrival rate of the information, the reliability of the information, the
accessibility of the information among the different trades and the perception of impact
of the information by the trading agents. The multi-agent implementation of a prediction
market allows us to easily analyze and verify the trading agents’ behavior while varying
different market and agent related internal parameters of the prediction market, as well as
external parameters related to the information about events arriving at the market. To
build our multi-agent system, we use modeling parameters obtained from various sources
such as existing analytical models of financial markets, empirical evidence and data from
real prediction markets, and agent utility and belief theory. The research question that
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we are trying to answer in this contribution is reproduced below in Table 3.1. We per-
form extensive simulations of our agent-based prediction market for analyzing the effect of
information related parameters on the trading agents’ behaviors expressed through their
trading prices. We also compare our prediction market’s behavior with an existing predic-
tion market model, and, our agents’ strategies with the zero-intelligence(ZI) agent strategy
that has been formerly used for strategic pricing in prediction markets. The results show
that our agent-based prediction market operates correctly and that our agents price predic-
tions result in higher utilities than ZI agents. Next, we describe modeling of some of the
information parameters we have used in our prediction market and some of our simulation
results. More details of our modeling parameters and complete simulation results can be
found in [55].
Contr. Research Question Research Approach
1 How do changes in different aspects Empirical Analysis
of information affect the behavior of
prediction markets?
Table 3.1: Research question that is addressed in contribution 1 of this thesis.
3.1 Preliminaries
In this chapter we use a multi-agent prediction market to empirically analyze its behavior
and the behavior of traders in response to different market parameters. In our prediction
market, each human trading agent is modeled as a software agent called a trading agent that
embodies the behavior of a human trading agent. We use a prediction market model that
is similar to the continuous double auction(CDA) protocol. Each event e is associated with
two prices in the market - a bid price πbuye,d at which trading agents can purchase a security
of the event and a ask price πselle,d at which trading agents can sell a security of the event
during day d. Both of these prices are normalized to the range of [0, 1] and trading agents
calculate the current market price of an event e during day d, πe,d, as the average of the






trading agents then interpret the current market price πe,d for the event e on day d as the
expected probability of the event e happening (that is, its outcome being 1).
A trading agent n ∈ N observes the information set In,e,d associated with event e on
day d and decides to place an order to buy the security associated with event e at a price
πbuyn,e,d or to sell the security associated with event e at a price π
sell
n,e,d. A market order for
trading a security contains the identifier and number of units of the security the trading
agent wishes to buy or sell. Market orders are executed instantly in the market, but the
price of πbuyn,e,d (for purchase orders) or π
sell
n,e,d (for sell orders) is not guaranteed to trading
agent n for buying or selling the security. Instead, if a trading agent wishes to purchase
the security, it has to pay a price of πbuye,d , corresponding to the maximum price that has
been offered by any trading agent for purchasing a security related to the event during the
day d. πbuye,d is called the bid (buy) price of the event and is given by π
buy
e,d = maxn∈N π
buy
n,e,d.
Similarly, when a trading agent wishes to sell the security, it has to pay a price of πselle,d ,




e,d is called the ask (sell) price of the event and corresponds
to the minimum price that a trading agent has offered for selling a security related to the
event during day d.
3.2 Agent-based Prediction Market
3.2.1 Trading Agents: Functionality and Parameters
One of the most important parameters in a prediction market is the perception of the
probability of occurrence of an event by the human traders. This parameter affects the
dynamic values of the prices of securities corresponding to the different events in the market
as well as the quantities of different securities each trader buys or sells. To model the
perception of event occurrence probabilities, each trading agent n in our prediction market
uses a private belief bn,e ∈ [0, 1] that corresponds to the probability that the event e will
occur with an outcome = 1. Existing models of prediction markets [34;69;82] have empirically
verified that this belief value is drawn from a Beta distribution. Following these studies,
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we have assumed in our prediction market that a trading agent n’s initial belief about the
outcome of an event being 1 is drawn independently from a continuous beta distribution
Beta(α, β), where α and β are positive shape parameters that determine the shape and
skew of the beta distribution’s curve. There are two cases when the belief of an agent is
dynamically updated. The first case is when the market price changes and the second case
is when a new information about the event becomes available to the trading agent. For
the first case, the belief update function used by our trading agents is based on Gjerstad’s
prediction market model [34] where, during each day, every time a market price of the security
for an event e changes, trading agent n updates its beliefs as a weighted sum of the event e’s
observed market prices during that day and its own beliefs using the belief update Equation
3.1.
bn,e ← µn,e,d · bn,e + (1− µn,e,d) · πe,d, (3.1)
where πe,d denotes the current market price of the security for event e during day d, bn,e
is the belief of agent n for event e, and µn,e,d ∈ (0, 1) is agent n’s belief weight factor
[111]
that represents the confidence of agent n in its current belief value about the outcome of
an event e. At the end of each day, agent n finds out whether its buy or sell order for that
day was executed or not and updates its belief weight factor using the equation (with U
representing a uniform distribution):
µn,e,d =
 U [0.5, 1] , if buy/sell order executed;U [0, 0.5] , if buy/sell order wasn’t executed.
This ensures that if the buy/sell order was executed (not executed) an agent gives a
higher (lower) preference to its own previous belief value while updating its belief using
Equation 3.1. The second case of the belief update is discussed in Section 3.2.3 after we
introduce the information modeling in our prediction market.
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3.2.2 Dynamic Information Modeling in Prediction Markets
Empirical data from real prediction markets such as the Iowa Electronic Marketplace show
that the belief value of trading agents for an event e is significantly affected by new in-
formation that arrives in the market. However, previous prediction market models do not
consider the effect of new event information on the belief values of a trading agent. To ad-
dress this deficit, we have introduced a new belief update formula that uses new parameters
in our prediction market, that are described below:
a. Information impact parameter ζi,e: In a prediction market, the price of the security
related to an event is changed by the traders every time new information about the
event becomes available. Also, different information about an event result in different
degrees of price change of the security. We incorporate the effect of new information
on the prices in the prediction market using an information impact parameter ζi,e ∈
[−0.5, 0.5] for information i related to event e. Larger values of ζi,e indicate high-
impact information or unexpected news related to an event, which significantly affects
the price of security related to the event. Smaller values of ζi,e indicate a normal-
impact or low-impact information. These correspond to expected news about an
event and don’t affect prices significantly.
b. Information reliability parameter rn,e: Previous research on online financial mar-
kets [65] have shown that different people rely on the new information in the market
to different degrees and that an information reliability parameter can be used to rep-
resent the level of agent n’s reliance on information regarding event e. Following a
study on the relation between trust and risk reported by Molm et al. [75], we consider
that the risk coefficient of an agent, θn,e,d, is affected by the reliability it associates
with new information related to events. To model this, we introduce an information
reliability parameter, rn,e of an agent n for an event e. If a trading agent n is a
risk-taker (θn,e,d < 0), then its reliability parameter is high (rn,e ∈ U [0.5, 1.0]), if it is
risk-neutral (θn,e,d = 0), then rn,e = 0.5, and if it is risk-averse (θn,e,d > 0), then its
reliability parameter is low (rn,e ∈ U [0, 0.5)). Thus, new information about an event
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e is perceived by the trading agents with different amounts of information reliabil-
ity. To model this behavior, the trading agents in our prediction market dynamically
update the reliability parameter at the end of each day using the following equation:
rn,e,d =

U [0, 0.5] , if θn,e,d > 0;
0.5 , if θn,e,d = 0;
U [0.5, 1.0] , if θn,e,d < 0.
c. Information availability parameter an,e: In real prediction markets, different traders
have access to different amounts of information related to events. Traders with access
to a larger amount of information related to events are able to make informed deci-
sions about the price of the securities related to events. We model different levels of
availability of information among the trading agents using an information availability
parameter an,e ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}. an,e = 1 indicates that agent n has access to all avail-
able information about event e in the market, while an,e = 0.5 and an,e = 0 indicate
limited and no access to information about event e respectively. Although the avail-
ability of information to human traders follows a more complex model, we restrict
the information availability parameter to three discrete values to get easily analyzable
results of the effect of information availability on the trading agents, without loss of
generality.
3.2.3 Agent Belief Revision based on new information
On each day in the prediction market, a trading agent has to make a decision about the
securities it wants to purchase, sell or hold. The belief value about the outcome of the events
related to the securities plays a pivotal role in making this decision. Therefore, every agent
has to update its belief values for each event it is interested in based on the new information
in the market related to those events. Because new information about events can arrive
into the market from various sources with different reliabilities, an agent should adjust the
impact of the information with the corresponding information reliability parameter. The
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reliability-weighted information impact parameter of an event then increases the belief value
about the outcome of that event if its positive, and decreases the belief value if it is negative.
Finally, to prevent rapid changes to the belief value, belief updates should also include the
current belief value of an event. The belief update equation based on these factors that is
used by a trading agent in our prediction market is given by:
bn,e ← rn,e,d · (bn,e − ¯ζi,e · ln bn,e) + (1− rn,e,d) · bn,e (3.2)
where ζ¯i,e =
∑
i ζi,e denotes the average value of the information impact parameter for all
information related to event e by agent n, and rn,e,d denotes the information reliability
parameter agent n has for event e on day d. A positive (negative) value of the information
impact factor, increases (decreases) the new belief value from its previous value, while a
zero value of the information impact factor does not change the belief value. Also, the
agent with higher information reliability accounts more for the information impact, while
the agent with smaller information reliability places more weight on its past belief.
3.2.4 Utility Maximization and Optimum Trading Quantity
Calculation
The main problem facing a trading agent in a prediction market is to determine what
quantities of each security to buy and sell on each day at the trading price of the security
so that it can maximize its own utility or monetary gain. To achieve this, a trading agent
dynamically incorporates new information about the event related to each security and
dynamically obtains updates of the current market price of each security to estimate the
optimum quantity of the security it should buy or sell. When the prediction market starts
on day d0, each trading agent n is provided with an initial wealth of wn,d0 > 0. We
consider each trading agent in our prediction market as a utility maximizer that buys or
sells securities to maximize its wealth on each day. The instantaneous utility of agent n on
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where, qselle,d is the number of securities related to an event e sold by agent n on day d, q
buy
e,d
is the number of securities related to an event e bought by agent n on day d, and πselle,d and
πbuye,d are respectively the ask and bid price of the security for event e during day d.
Equation 3.3 maintains the instantaneous utility of the agent n on day d depending on
the transactions it has made on that day, however it does not account for its risk type.
Previous research [34;111] has shown that the correct behavior of prediction market models
can be obtained only if the risk-taking and risk-averse behaviors of the human traders
are considered while trading securities in prediction markets. Therefore, in our prediction
market we adopt a constant relative risk averse (CRRA) utility function u˜n,d for agent n
with a relative risk aversion coefficient. CRRA utility functions have been widely used to
model risk behaviors. Relative risk aversion coefficient, θn, is used to classify trading agent
n’s risk levels as follows. If θn > 0, the agent n is risk-averse, if θn = 0, the agent n is
risk-neutral, and if θn < 0, the agent n is risk-seeking. The trading agents’ risk coefficients
are normally distributed in our simulations. Following Gjerstad’s trading agent utility
model [34], during each day a trading agent uses its instantaneous utility and its risk-taking





1−θn , if θn 6= 1;
ln(u´n,d) , if θn = 1.
(3.4)
The utility value for an agent can fluctuate considerably in successive days based on its
trading pattern, and the price of securities in the market. Large fluctuations in the utility
can in turn delay the convergence to equilibrium because it can cause large fluctuations in
the number of securities being bought or sold in the market. To prevent these fluctuations
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δh · u˜n,d, (3.5)
where δh is a discount factor that ensures that more recent utility levels have a greater
influence on the current weighted utility,
∑d−H
h=d δh = 1, and H is the number of days
considered from the past.
The final objective of a rational trading agent is to maximize the utility it receives
from purchasing and selling securities in the prediction market. To achieve this objective,
a trading agent has to calculate the optimum quantity of securities it should trade so that
the resulting utility is maximized. Let Qn,e,d denote the optimum quantity of securities
related to event e for trading agent n during day d. The trading agent’s decision is to
choose quantity to buy or sell for each security, so that the expected utility is maximized.





1−θn bn,e,d(un,d +Qn,e,d · (1− πe,d))
1−θn+
(1− bn,e,d)(un,d −Qn,e,d · πe,d)
1−θn , if θn 6= 1;
bn,e,d · ln(un,d +Qn,e,d · (1− πe,d))+
(1− bn,e,d)ln(un,d −Qn,e,d · πe,d) , if θn = 1.
where πe,d is the current market price of the security for an event e on day d. The optimum
quantity Qn,e,d is obtained by taking the first-order derivative of the expected utility equa-
tion above, setting the resulting equation equal to 0, and solving it to obtain the following
solution:
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Figure 3.1: A flowchart showing the operation of the trading agents in the prediction
market.
If Qn,e,d > qn,e,d, that is the quantity required to maximize utility on day d is more than
the number of securities of event e that agent n currently has on day d, the agent places a
buy order for purchasing Qn,e,d − qn,e,d additional units of the security of event e. On the
other hand, if Qn,e,d < qn,e,d, the agent places a sell order for selling Qn,e,d − qn,e,d units of
the security of event e. The agents set their prices corresponding to their current beliefs;
that is, πbuyn,e,d = bn,e,d if the trader is purchasing securities of event e and π
sell
n,e,d = bn,e,d if
45
the trader is selling securities of event e during day d.
Figure 3.1 gives a flowchart of the algorithm used by a trading agent in our agent-
based prediction market. Each trading agent n enters the prediction market with some
initial wealth, a belief about the outcome of each event that is initially drawn from a
Beta distribution, a risk coefficient, and, information reliability and information availability
parameter values. First, the agent checks its information availability parameter an,e and
updates its beliefs about an event e (using Equation 3.2) with a probability corresponding
to the value of an,e. Throughout the day, the trading agent n checks whether the market
price for the security associated with an event e has been updated. When the market price
is changed, the trading agent updates its beliefs using Equation 3.1. At the end of each day,
the trading agent n updates its utility using Equation 3.5 and calculates Qe,d, the number
of units of security corresponding to event e it needs to maximize its utility. Based on Qe,d
value it then makes a decision to buy, sell, or to hold a security associated with an event e
and submits an order to the prediction market. If the order is accepted, the trading agent
n updates its weighted utility using Equation 3.3. Finally, the trading agent’s information
reliability parameter is updated and the new day starts.
3.3 Simulation Results
We verify the performance of our prediction market through several simulations while vary-
ing different market, event and agent related parameters. The first objective of our sim-
ulations is to clarify that our prediction market behaves in a manner similar to actual
prediction markets with human traders. Secondly, we attempt to understand the dynamic
behavior of trading agents’ prices and utilities under different values of the information
related parameters.
3.3.1 Model Comparison
For our first set of experiments, we compare the performance of our multi-agent predic-
tion market with the model proposed by Gjerstad [34]. The price data for this experiment
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was taken from the 2008 Democratic Presidential Nomination Market in IEM [71]. There
are four securities in this market representing four different outcomes, i.e., Hillary Clinton,
John Edwards, Barack Obama, or another candidate winning the democratic presidential
nomination. Figure 3.2 shows the difference between the actual market price and the pre-












































Figure 3.2: The comparison of the simulated market prices with real market prices
in a prediction market based on Gjerstad’s model(a) and our agent-based prediction
market(b). The solid line represents perfect prediction of market prices by agents.
dicted market price while using our agent-based prediction market (a) and the prediction
market based on the Gjerstad’s model (b) for the security corresponding to Obama winning
the nomination. The error bars show the confidence intervals over 10 runs. As shown in
Figure 3.2, the difference between the predicted and actual prices using our agent-based
prediction market is significantly lower (8%) than that reported in Gjerstad’s model (35%).
The more accurate price prediction in our prediction market can be attributed to our belief
update mechanism that considers two additional parameters - the risk coefficient of each
agent through the information reliability parameter rn,e, as well as the information impact
parameter ζi,e, as compared to Gjerstad’s model. These parameters incorporate the infor-
mation flow across the agents in the market as well as the effect of the information of the
agents, and, therefore, enable the agents to make a more informed decision about the belief
related to the event in the market.
For all of our other simulations in this contribution, we use price data from the movie
markets in Iowa Electronic Marketplace(IEM) [71]. A security in a movie market on IEM
47






















Figure 3.3: A graph showing the effect of the information impact parameter on the
market prices.
corresponds to a boolean event - whether the box office collections of a certain Hollywood
movie will reach a predetermined dollar amount. The movie market securities are particu-
larly suitable for our agent-based prediction market because like the events in our market,
the events corresponding to the different movies are not correlated with each other.
3.3.2 Effect of information impact
In a prediction market, the same information about an event can cause different traders to
behave differently based on the traders’ perceptions of the impact of that information. In our
next set of experiments, we attempt to analyze the effect of different traders having different
information impact parameters on the belief values of agents in the market. Our definition
of the dependency between agent belief values and the information impact parameters is
given in Equation 3.2, which is reproduced below:
bn,e,d = rn,e,d · (bn,e,d−1 − ¯ζi,e · ln bn,e,d−1) + (1− rn,e,d) · bn,e,d−1
From this equation, we see that a positive(negative) value of the information impact
factor causes an increase(decrease) in the belief value of an agent for a security, while a
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zero value of the impact factor does not change the belief value. This increases the utility
the agent receives and results in more buy(sell) orders from the agent (using Equation 3.6)
before the event expires. To verify the effect of different values of the information impact
factor, we consider the effect of a positive-only impact factor (ζi,e ∈ U [0.1, 0.5]), a negative-
only impact factor (ζi,e ∈ U [−0.5,−0.1]), and the impact factor consisting of mixed positive
and negative values (ζi,e ∈ U [−0.3, 0.3]).
In prediction markets, trading agents’ beliefs about an event are expressed through the
aggregated market price of the event. We have therefore used the real closing prices of the
MAT45H security that has a duration of 25 days from the IEM movie data to analyze the
effect of information impact factor on the agents’ beliefs. For this set of experiments, each
trading agent n is assumed to have fixed information reliability parameter rn,e = 0.5 about
each event e. In Figure 3.3, we report the results of the different values of the information im-
pact parameter on the aggregate market prices of the agents over the 25-day duration of the
security.
Mean of ζi,e Mean Variance




Figure 3.4: Mean and variance of
the market prices under different
ζi,e values.
Figure 3.4 shows the means and the variances of the
market prices corresponding to different values of the
information impact factor from the results shown in
Figure 3.3. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient be-
tween the means of the information impact factor
values and the means of the market prices obtained
under the corresponding ζi,e values is 0.98. A positive
value of the correlation coefficient close to 1 shows
that market prices are strongly correlated with the
value of the information impact parameter. When
the impact factor of the new information about an event has mixed positive and negative
values, then it does not have a significant impact on the market prices as shown by the
U [−0.3, 0.3] curve in Figure 3.3.
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3.3.3 Effect of information availability
In this set of experiments we set out to test if different information availability levels related
to events have any effect on trading agents’ beliefs and the agents’ utilities. We have
once again used agents’ ask prices to illustrate the relationship between the information
availability and the agents’ beliefs because agents express their beliefs by setting their
bid and ask prices. By analyzing ask prices, we can also see how different the information
availability values lead to different prices being set by agents, which in turn leads to different
values in utility. Different levels of availability of information among the trading agents can
result in different trading decisions made by the trading agents and therefore in different
utility. For example, a trading agent with all the information about an event available with
it, can benefit from that information by making more informed trading decisions and get
a higher utility. We have used the information availability parameter described in Section
3.2.2, an,e = {0, 0.5, 1}, to denote different degrees of information penetration among the
trading agents. We have again reported the results using the closing prices and event’s
duration from the MINC180H security of the IEM movie market. In our simulations, one
third of the trading agent population has no access to the information about the event with
an,e = 0, another third of the agent population has partial access to the information with
an,e = 0.5, while the final third of the population has full access to the information with
an,e = 1. The results of our simulations are shown in Figure 3.5.










































Figure 3.5: Effect of the different levels of information availability on (a) the trading
agents’ ask prices and (b) their utilities.
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From these results, we calculated the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the infor-
mation availability parameter and the market price and found it to be −0.88. This indicates
that there is a strong negative association between the market price and the information
availability parameter. This implies that the trading agents with more information (higher
value of an,e) about the event are able to set the lowest ask prices for the event’s security
and purchase the security. Figure 3.5(b) shows that trading agents with full information
availability are able to obtain higher utility than other agents. This behavior can be at-
tributed to the fact that if an,e = 1, the agent’s belief function update using Equation 3.2 is
always triggered to include new information about the event e if available, as shown in the
flowchart in Figure 3.1. This results in more up-to-date values of beliefs (using Equation
3.2) and ensures more accurate value of the quantity of security that the agent should trade
(using Equation 3.6) and culminates in higher utility to the trading agent. On the other
hand, if an,e = 0.5, the agent’s belief function update using Equation 3.2 is triggered only
50% of the time, resulting in less utility for agent n. When an,e = 0, the agent n’s belief
function update using Equation 3.2 is never triggered, resulting in the least utility for agent
n. Our result also agrees intuitively with the behavior of real traders in prediction markets
- more information about an event enables a trader to make a more informed decision and
thereby obtain higher utilities.
3.3.4 Effect of scalability
For our next set of experiments in this chapter, we have tested the scalability of our multi-
agent based prediction market with the number of trading agents and the number of events.
We have tested our prediction market with different combinations of 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25
events, and, 50, 100, 300, 500 and 1000 trading agents in the market. Table 3.2 shows the
average utility for a trader at the end of 100 days. We observe that as the number of events
in the market increases, the traders’ utilities increase by 30% because they are able to trade
in more securities. In a similar manner, when the number of trading agents in the market
increases but the number of events is fixed, the average utility of a trader decreases by
40% because of the increased competition between traders in the market. In summary, as
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Traders→/ 50 100 300 500 1000 Avg. over
Events↓ no. of agents
5 1480.5 1191.9 1071.0 1003.6 893.5 1059.1
10 1560.0 1265.0 1187.5 1089.6 965.2 1183.6
15 175716 1456.8 1299.2 1174.6 1006.5 1306.3
20 1791.1 1545.5 1424.5 1287.5 1104.4 1397.8
25 1843.3 1643.2 1534.5 1393.8 1275.2 1511.2
Avg. over no. 1631.5 1406.7 1295.0 1153.9 970.9
of events
Table 3.2: Utilities of one trader from the simulations with different number of traders and
events.
the prediction market becomes more populated in the number of events and the number of
agents, the utilities of the trading agents increase correspondingly.
Our simulation results quantify the effect of information on the price dynamics and
utilities of trading agents in a prediction market. We briefly summarize our simulation
results. From our results we observe that the trading agents with a higher value of the
information reliability are able to obtain higher utilities. This allows us to conclude that a
higher reliance of the trading agents on the information in the market allows them to get
more news about the event and make more informed decisions. We also observe that the
trading agents with more information (higher value of information availability parameter)
about the event are able to obtain higher utilities. This result suggests that the trading
agents that have access to more information are able to use the available information to
obtain higher utilities. This also consistent with the behavior of human traders in real
prediction markets, where well-informed traders are able to make better decisions. Overall,
our results suggest that different aspects of the information about events in a prediction
market have a significant impact of the prices, utilities and probabilities of the events in the
market. This and other simulation results obtained for this part of the thesis can be used
to obtain a better understanding of traders’ behavior in a prediction market in response to
information about events. The work presented in this chapter was published in [55] and the
overview of our findings is shown in Table 3.3.
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Contr. Research Question Research Findings
1 How do changes in different - Higher information arrival rate leads to
aspects of information lower price fluctuations and higher utilities.
affect the behavior of - Higher impact information tends to
increase the prices.
prediction markets? - Higher reliability of information leads to
more stable prices and higher utilities.
- Higher information availability results in,
lower prices and higher utilities.
Table 3.3: Research findings for the research question in contribution 1 of this thesis.
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Chapter 4
A Multi-Agent Prediction Market
based on Partially Observable
Stochastic Games for Analyzing
the Behavior of the Trading Agents
In this work, we address the problem of designing a formal and realistic framework of
prediction market that can be used to model the interactions of the software trading agents.
Our main goal is to develop a strategy for trading agents that when used in our proposed
framework can improve information aggregation in a prediction market as well as improve
the utilities of the trading agents in general.
The work in this chapter builds upon previous directions of research on prediction
markets and develops a game-theoretic formal model for the strategic behavior of trading
agents. The main contribution of this chapter is to use a partially observable stochastic
game (POSG) [45] that can be used by each agent to reason about its actions. Within
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this POSG model, we calculate the correlated equilibrium strategy for each agent using the
aggregated price from the market maker as a recommendation signal. We have also consider
the risk preferences of trading agents in prediction markets and show that a Pareto optimal
correlated equilibrium solution can give incentives for truthful revelation to risk averse
agents. We then compare the POSG/correlated equilibrium based trading strategy with
five different trading strategies used in similar markets with the data obtained from the
Intrade prediction market events. Our results show that the agents using the correlated
equilibrium strategy profile are able to predict prices that are closer to the actual prices
that occurred in real prediction markets and these traders also obtain 35 − 127% higher
utilities. The research questions that we try to answer in this contribution are reproduced
below in Table 4.1.
Contr. Research Question Research Approach
2 How do different trading agent behaviors Empirical Analysis
affect the behavior of prediction markets?
2 What trading strategies perform the Empirical Analysis
best in prediction markets?
2 How can prediction markets incentivize Theoretical Examination
trading agents to participate in order to
achieve a higher prediction accuracy?
2 How does the trader’s behavior using Empirical Analysis
a formal game-theoretic model
compare to the trader’s behavior
in real prediction markets?
Table 4.1: Research questions that are addressed in contribution 2 of this thesis.
4.1 Partially Observable Stochastic Games for Trad-
ing Agent Interaction
As before, we assume that each human trader is represented by a software trading agent that
buys and sells securities on behalf of the human trader. For simplicity of explanation, we
consider a prediction market where a single security is being traded over a certain duration.
This duration is divided into trading periods, with each trading period corresponding to
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a certain time period in a real prediction market. The ‘state’ of the market is expressed
as the quantity of the purchased units of the security in the market. At the end of each
trading period, each trading agent receives information about the state of the market from
the market maker. With this prior information, the task of a trading agent is to determine
a suitable quantity to trade for the next trading period, so that its utility is maximized.
In this scenario, the environment of the agent is partially observable because other agents’
actions and payoffs are not known directly, but available through their aggregated beliefs.
Agents interact with each other in stages (trading periods), and in each stage the state of
the market is determined stochastically based on the actions of the agents and the previous
state. This scenario directly corresponds to the setting of a partially observable stochastic
game [33;45]. A POSG model offers several attractive features such as structured behavior by
the agents by using best response strategies, stability of the outcome based on equilibrium
concepts, lookahead capability of the agent to plan their actions based on future expected
outcomes, ability to represent the temporal characteristics of the interactions between the
agents, and, enabling all computations locally on the agents so that the system is robust
and scalable.
Previous research [55] has shown that information related parameters in a prediction
market such as information availability, information reliability, information penetration,
etc., have a considerable effect on the belief (price) estimation by trading agents. Based on
these findings, we posit that a component to model the impact of information related to an
event should be added to the POSG framework. With this feature in mind, we propose an
interaction model called a partially observable stochastic game with information (POSGI)
for capturing the strategic decision making by trading agents. A POSGI is defined as:
Γ = (N,S, (Ai)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N , T, (Oi)i∈N ,Ω, (Ii)i∈N ), where N is a finite set of agents, S is a
finite, non-empty set of states - each state corresponding to certain quantity of the security
being held (purchased) by the trading agents. Ai is a finite non-empty action space of agent
i s.t. ak = (a1,k, ..., a|N |,k) is the joint action of the agents and ai,k is the action that agent
i takes in state k ∈ S, where agents take actions sequentially. In terms of the prediction
market, a trading agent’s action corresponds to certain quantity of security it buys or sells,
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while the joint action corresponds to changing the purchased quantity for a security and
taking the market to a new state. Ri,k is the reward or payoff for agent i in state k which
is calculated using the LMSR market maker. T : T (s, a, s′) = P (s′|s, a) is the transition
probability of moving from state s to state s′ after joint action a has been performed by
the agents. Oi is a finite non-empty set of observations for agent i that consists of the
market price and the information signal, and oi,k ∈ Oi is the observation agent i receives
in state k. Ω : Ω(sk, Ii,k, oi,k) = P (oi,k|sk, Ii,k) is the observation probability for agent i of
receiving observation oi,k in state sk when the information signal is Ii,k. Finally, Ii is the
information set received by agent i for an event Ii =
⋃
k Ii,k where Ii,k ∈ {−1, 0,+1} is the
information received by agent i in state k. The complete information arriving to the market
I =
⋃
i∈N Ii is temporally distributed over the duration of the event. Information that
improves the probability of the positive outcome of the event is considered positive (Ii,k =
+1) and vice-versa, while information that does not affect the probability is considered to
have no effect (Ii,k = 0). For example, for a security related to the event “Obama wins
2008 presidential elections”, information about Oprah Winfrey endorsing Obama would be
considered high impact positive information and information about Obama losing the New
Hampshire Primary would be considered negative information.
Based on the POSGI formulation of the prediction market, the interaction of an agent
with the environment (prediction market) and the information source can be represented
by the transition diagram shown in Figure 4.1∗. The environment (prediction market) goes
through a set of states S˜ = {s1, ..., sH} : S˜ ∈ S, where H is the duration of the event
in the prediction market and sh represents the state of the market during trading period
h. This state of the market is not visible to any agent. Instead, each agent i has its own
internal belief state Bi,h corresponding to its belief about the actual state sh. Bi,h gives
a probability distribution over the set of states S, where Bi,h = (b1,h, ..., b|S|,h). Consider
trading period h − 1 when the agents perform the joint action ah−1. Because of this joint
action of the agents the environment stochastically changes to a new state sh, defined by the
∗We only show one agent i to keep the diagram legible, but the same representation is valid for
every agent in the prediction market. The dotted lines represent that the reward and environment
state is determined by the joint action of all agents.
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Figure 4.1: An agent interactions with the hidden environment (prediction market)
and an external information source.
state transition function T (sh−1, ah−1, sh). The agent i doesn’t directly see the environment
state, but instead receives an observation oi,Sh = (πsh , Ii,sh), that includes the market price
πsh corresponding to the state sh as informed by the market maker, and the information
signal Ii,sh . The agent i then uses a belief update function to update its beliefs. Finally,
agent i selects an action using an action selection strategy and receives a reward Ri,sh . The
belief update and action selection strategy of the trading agent are discussed next.
4.1.1 Trading agent belief update and utility functions
Recall from Section 4.1 that a belief state of a trading agent is a probability vector that gives
a distribution over the set of states S in the prediction market, i.e. Bi,h = (b1,h, ..., b|S|,h).
A trading agent uses its belief update function b : ℜ|S|×Ai×Oi → ℜ|S| to update its belief
state based on its past action ai,h−1, past belief state Bi,h−1 and the observation oi,Sh . The
calculation of the belief update function for each element of the belief state, bs′,h, s
′ ∈ S, is
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described below:
bs′,h = P (s
′|ai,h−1, oi) =




′, ai,h−1) · P (s′, ai,h−1)
P (oi|ai,h−1)P (ai,h−1)
(4.1)
Because ai,h−1 is conditionally independent given s′ and oi is conditionally independent
given ai,h−1, we can rewrite Equation 4.1 as:
bs′,h =
P (oi|s
′) · P (s′, ai,h−1)
P (oi)P (ai,h−1)
=∑
ι∈I P (ι)P (oi|s
′, ι)
∑





ι∈I P (ι)P (oi|s
′, ι)
∑












All the terms in the r.h.s. of the Equation 4.2 can be calculated by an agent: P (ι) is
the probability of receiving information signal ι , Ω(s′, ι, oi) is the probability of receiving
observation oi in state s
′ when the information signal is ι, T (s, ai,h−1, s′) is the probability
that the state s transitions to state s′ after agent i takes action ai,h−1, bs,h−1 is the past
belief of agent i about state s, P (oi) is the probability of receiving observation oi, which is
constant and can be viewed as a normalizing constant.
Incorporating the risk preferences of the trading agents is an important factor in pre-
diction markets. For example, the erroneous result related to the non-correlation between
the trader beliefs and market prices in a prediction market in [69] was because the risk pref-
erences of the traders were not accounted for, as noted in [34]. This problem is particularly
relevant for risk averse traders because the beliefs(prices) and risk preferences of traders
have been reported to be directly correlated [26;62]. Therefore, in our model we assume that
the trading agents are risk-averse. The risk preference of an agent i is modeled through
a utility function called the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). We use CRRA utility
function to model risk averse agents because it allows to model the effect of different levels
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of risk aversion and it has been shown to be a better model than alternative families of
risk modeling utilities [106]. It has been widely used for modeling risk aversion in various
domains including economic domain [49], psychology [66] and in the health domain [8]. The
CRRA utility function, ui(φ,Ri), for agent i (for legibility we have dropped state k, but




, if θi 6= 1 (4.3)
= ln(Ri), if θi = 1
Here, −1 < θi < 1 is called the risk preference factor of agent i with θi > 0 for risk-averse
agents and Ri is the payoff or reward to agent i calculated using the LMSR as was discussed
in Section 2.2.2. The reward Ri is calculated after agent i’s trade is executed.





















































Figure 4.2: Finite state automata of the environment represented by the number of
outstanding units of the security, q, in the prediction market.
The objective of a trading agent in a prediction market is to select an action at each
stage so that the expected reward that it receives is maximized. To understand this action
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selection process, we consider the decision problem facing each trading agent. As an example
consider two agents whose available actions during each time step are to buy (=+1) or
sell(=-1) only one unit of the security or not do anything (=0) by holding the security. Let
the market state be denoted by q, the number of purchased units of the security. Based on
the set of actions available to each agent, the state can transition to one of the following
states q + 2 (both agents buy), q + 1 (only one agent buys), q (both agents hold, or, one
agent buys while the other agent sells, resulting in no transition), q − 1 (only agent sells),
and q − 2 (both agents sell). Figure 4.2 shows the finite state automata generated in this
way. We can expand this state space further by adding more states and transitions, but
the number of states remains finite because the set of states S of the POSGI is finite. Also,
since the number of units of a security is finite, the number of securities the trading agent is
allowed to buy or sell is bounded and the number of transitions from a state is guaranteed
to be bounded. We also do not consider budget restrictions for the trading agents in this
work.
4.1.3 Correlated Equilibrium (CE) calculation
In the POSGI, the aggregated price information received by a trading agent from the market
maker can be treated as a recommendation signal for selecting the agent’s strategy. This
situation lends itself to a correlated equilibrium (CE) [2;89], where a trusted external agent
privately recommends a strategy to play to each player. A correlated equilibrium is more
preferred to the Nash or Bayesian Nash equilibrium because it can lead to improved payoffs,
and it can be calculated using a linear program in time polynomial in the number of agents
and number of strategies.
Each agent i has a finite set of strategy profiles, Φi defined over its action space Ai.
The joint strategy space is given by Φ =
∏|N |
i=1 Φi and let Φ−i =
∏
j 6=iΦj . Let φ ∈ Φ
denote a strategy profile and φi denote player i’s component in φ. A correlated equilibrium
is a distribution p on Φ such that for all agents i and all strategies φi, φ
′
i if all agents
follow a strategy profile φ that recommends player i to choose strategy φi, agent i has no




φ−i∈Φ−i p(φ)(ui(φ) − ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀φi, φ
′
i ∈ Φi and where ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)
is the utility that agent i gets when it changes its strategy to φ′i while all the other agents
keep their strategies fixed at φ−i and p(φ) is the probability of realizing a given strategy
profile φ.
We now prove the existence of a correlated equilibrium in our POSGI-based prediction
market.
Theorem 1. A correlated equilibrium(CE) exists in our POSGI-based prediction market
representation at each stage (trading period).
Proof. At each stage in our prediction market, we can specify the correlated equilibrium by





i, φ−i)) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N,∀φi, φ
′
i ∈ Φi (4.4)
∑
φ∈Φ
p(φ) = 1, (4.5)
p(φ) ≥ 0 (4.6)
Equation 4.4 states that when agent i is recommended to select strategy φi, it must get
no less utility from selecting strategy φi as it would from selecting any other strategy
φ′i. Constraints given in Equations 4.5 and 4.6 guarantee that p is a valid probability
distribution. We can rewrite the linear program specification of the correlated equilibrium












i, φ−i)) ≥ 0, (4.8)
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p(φ) ≥ 0 (4.9)
Equation 4.8 is either trivial with a maximum of 0 or unbounded. Next, we show the
relationship between Equation 4.5, which defines correlated equilibrium in the form of a
constraint program, and the alternate formulation of this problem given in Equation 4.8.
Lemma 1. Problem given in Equation 4.5 has a solution iff problem in Equation 4.8 is
unbounded.
Proof. If problem in Equation 4.5 has a solution p(φ), then p(φ) is also feasible in the
problem given in Equation 4.8. However, since for any a > 1 ap(φ) is also feasible in
Equation 4.8, but it has a larger value, p(φ) is not optimal solution in Equation 4.8. Thus,
lima→∞
∑
φ∈Φ(ap(φ)) =∞ and therefore problem in Equation 4.8 is unbounded.
If the problem in Equation 4.8 is unbounded, its set of solutions is non-empty (by
definition). We can transform an arbitrary solution p′(φ) 6= 0 into a solution p(φ) for
problem in Equation 4.5 by normalizing to guarantee that p(φ) is a valid distribution.
Lemma 1 shows that there is a correlated equilibrium if and only if problem in Equation
4.8 is unbounded. To prove the unboundedness we consider the dual problem of Equation
4.8 given in Equation 4.11.






T ≤ −1 (4.11)
p(φ) ≥ 0 (4.12)
where for every p(φ) there is p(φ) such that p(φ)[(ui(φ) − ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)]p(φ) = 0.
In [89], the authors showed that the problem given in Equation 4.11 is infeasible. From
operations research we know that when the dual problem is infeasible the primal problem
is feasible and unbounded. This means that the primal problem from Equation 4.8 is
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unbounded. We can then conclude that there is at least one correlated equilibrium in every
trading period of the prediction market. We note that although the CRRA utility function
is concave, the concave structure does not affect the existence of at least one correlated
equilibrium because the unboundedness of Equation 4.8 is not affected by the concave
structure of ui.
To calculate correlated equilibrium(CE) we first characterize the set of all Pareto optimal
strategy profiles. A strategy profile φP is Pareto optimal if there does not exist another
strategy profile φ′ such that ui(φ′) ≥ ui(φP ) ∀i ∈ N with at least one inequality strict. In
other words, a Pareto optimal strategy profile is one such that no trader could be made
better off without making someone else worse off. A Pareto optimal strategy profile can be




λiui(φ) for some λi (4.13)
Setting λi = 1 for all i ∈ N gives a utilitarian social welfare function. The maximization
problem in Equation 4.13 can be solved using the Lagrangian method. We get the following






= 0 , ∀j = 1, ..., |N | (4.14)
that must hold at φP . Each of these equations is obtained by taking a partial derivative
of the respective agent’s weighted utility with respect to respective agent’s strategy profile,
thus solving the maximization problem given in Equation 4.13. By solving the system of
equations 4.14 we get the set of Pareto optimal strategy profiles, ΦP .
We then apply CE calculation algorithm shown in Algorithm 1 on ΦP . Algorithm
1 is based on the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm proposed by [89]. We have used the
correction proposed by Stein et al. [90] to solve the numerical precision problems that might
arise in the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm. The calculation of the matrix values of the
U matrix must be done once for each of the N agents. The computation of the utility
difference ui(φ) − ui(φi, φ−i) for each agent i can be done in |ΦPi |
2 time. Therefore, the
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time complexity of the CECalc algorithm during each trading period comes to N × |ΦPi |
2.
CECalc(D,ΦP )
Input: D,ΦP //D is the duration of the market, ΦP is the set of Pareto
optimal strategies
Output: p //correlated equilibrium
foreach t← 0 to D do
//do this in each trading period
Let U be the matrix consisting of the values of (ui(φ)− ui(φi, φ−i)),
∀i ∈ N, φ ∈ ΦP , φ−i ∈ ΦPi
p′t ← getDualDistribution(Φ
P , U);
pt ← solve for pt s.t. ptU




Input: ΦP , U
Output: ∆
l = 0;
p′l ∈ [0, 1];
∆ = {};
while UT · p′l ≤ −1 is feasible do
∆ = ∆+ p′l;
p′l+1 = pl + ǫ





Algorithm 1: Correlated Equilibrium Algorithm
Proposition 1. If p is a correlated equilibrium and φ is a Pareto optimal strategy profile
calculated by p in a prediction market with risk averse agents, then the strategy profile φP
is incentive compatible, that is each agent is best off reporting truthfully.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that φP is not an incentive compatible strategy,
that is, there is some other φ′ for which
ui(φ
′) ≥ ui(φP ) (4.15)
Equation 4.15 violates two properties of φP . First of all, since φP is Pareto optimal, we
know that Equation 4.15 is not true, since ui(φ
P ) ≥ ui(φ
′) by the definition of Pareto
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optimal strategy profile. Secondly, if we rewrite Equation 4.15 as ui(φ
P ) − ui(φ
′) ≤ 0 and
multiply both sides by p(φP ), we get p(φP )[ui(φ
P ) − ui(φ
′)] ≤ 0. Since p is a correlated
equilibrium this inequality can not hold, otherwise it would violate the definition of the
correlated equilibrium.
4.2 Experimental Results
We conduct several simulations using our POSGI prediction market. The main objective
of our simulations is to test whether there is a benefit to the agents to follow the correlated
equilibrium strategy. We do this by analyzing the utilities of the agents and the market price.
We consider events that are disjoint (non-combinatorial). This allows us to compare our
proposed strategy empirically with other existing strategies while using real data collected
from the Intrade prediction market, which also considers non-combinatorial events. We
report the market price for the security corresponding to the outcome of the event occurring.
We assume that risk aversion coefficient of our trading agents, θ = 0.6, since experimental
evidence suggests that this value captures humans’ risk attitude without being too extreme
in either direction [37]. Since currently there is no real data relating to the risk averseness of
the human traders and our main goal is to demonstrate the performance of our algorithm,
we assume that the trading agents all have the same level of risk aversion.
4.2.1 Intrade Data
For all of our experimental results we use commercially available data from four diverse
prediction markets obtained from Intrade [51] company. The details of the Intrade markets
that are used for our experiments are given in Table 4.2 and the market prices of these
markets in Intrade are shown in Figure 4.3. We note that the date format that is used in
Intrade’s data and shown in our graphs is day/month/year. We have obtained the general
market data comprising of the market price data for each day and also the trade data
consisting of the number of shares bought and sold by individual traders and the changes
in price after each trade. Intrade prediction market allows for two possible outcomes to
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Name Description Total Total number Duration
number of securities (Trading
of traders traded period)
Presidential “Barack Obama to be 3252 1, 244, 892 744 days
Election elected President in 2008”
Recession “The US economy to 728 75, 187 600 days
go into recession in 2008”
Best “The Social Network 242 18,767 142 days
Picture to win Best Picture 2011”
American “Lee DeWyze to win 105 17,292 93 days
Idol American Idol (Season 9)”
Table 4.2: Intrade markets used for our experiments.














































































Figure 4.3: Market prices of American Idol(a), Best Picture(b), Recession(c), and
Presidential Elections(d) Intrade markets.
each event - yes, the event will happen as described, or no, it will not happen. Intrade is an
exchange, so each trader buys or sells securities from another member of Intrade. Therefore,
for our experiments we assume that the market maker in our model only calculates the
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Figure 4.4: Modified diagram of the operations of a trading agent used in our exper-
iments.
market price and the trading agents’ rewards, but does not sell or buy securities itself. In
Intrade when the market’s outcome becomes known, the market settles at either $0 or $10.
If the market’s event happens, the traders holding securities corresponding to the market
get paid $10 for every security that they hold. If the market’s event does not happen, the
traders with the securities of that market do not get anything. Also, since Intrade allows
short selling, i.e. selling securities that you don’t yet own, we also allow short selling in our
simulated POSGI market.
In all of our simulations we use the same number of trading agents as the number of
traders in Intrade markets, and we also sync the start, trade and end times of our trading
agents in each simulated market with the start, trade and end times of the real traders from
Intrade markets. Figure 4.4 is a modified Figure 3.1 indicating the inputs to and outputs
of our POSGI prediction market model used for our simulations. Trading agents receive
Intrade’s market price according to time steps indicated in the Intrade’s data. The market
price in Intrade is updated after each trade. We conduct two types of experiments, in the
first type of experiments we compare the utility from CE strategy with the utility from the
Intrade market, and in the second type of experiments we compare CE strategy to other
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well-known strategies. For the first type of experiments, in order to be able to compare
with the Intrade’s data we assume that the trading agents receive Intrade’s market price
instead of the LMSR market price, but they use CE strategy to determine their action and
receive utility based on it. For the second type of experiments, we assume that the market
maker uses LMSR to calculate the market price as specified in the POSGI model.
We use Google News [77] to obtain information signals that the trading agents receive.
We use each market’s description as specified by Intrade to obtain results in Google News,
which are then narrowed down by the time period during which each market was active.
The results are then ran through SentiStrength [103], which is a tool that estimates the
strength of positive and negative sentiment in short texts. We specify positive strength
sentiment to be 1, negative strength sentiment to be −1, and neutral strength sentiment to
be 0. SentiStrength basically gives a score (1,−1 or 0) to each result obtained from Google
News, which is then used as an information signal sent to a number of the trading agents
selected randomly from the total agent population at the same time step (date and time)
as the date and time it was published on Google News. Finally, the trading agents in our
model update their beliefs either when they receive a new information signal or at the belief
update time step interval, which is determined as an average trading time of all traders in
the market.
We notice that there were different kind of traders in the Intrade markets, for example
some traders were very active and some were not very active, some traders only joined the
market for 1 day and some traded in the market throughout its duration. Therefore in
order to analyze the performance of different types of trading agents, we have clustered
the traders in each of four Intrade markets that we have used according to the duration of
their participation in the market and the number of their trades. We use EM(expectation
maximization) clustering technique [25] within a popular clustering tool, called Weka 3.6 [44].
We didn’t specify the number of clusters, instead EM used cross validation to select the
number of clusters automatically. We obtained 3 clusters for the American Idol and Best
Picture markets, 4 clusters for the Recession market, and 4 clusters for the Presidential
Election market.
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Figure 4.5: Average utilities of the traders in Intrade markets and the trading agents
in POSGI prediction market for clusters 1 (a), 2 (b), and 3 (c) in the American Idol
market.









































Figure 4.6: Average cumulative utilities of traders in Intrade markets and trading
agents in POSGI prediction markets for clusters 1 (a), 2 (b), and 3 (c) in the Best
Picture market.
For our first set of experiments, we want to compare the performance of the trading
agents using CE strategy within POSGI model with the performance of the traders in the
real Intrade market. We ran simulations of our POGSI model where all trading agents
use CE strategy and we compare their utility to the utility of the actual traders in the
Intrade markets using Equation 4.4. We show the results for the average cumulative utility
of the traders in Intrade market and the average cumulative utility of the trading agents
in the POSGI market for each cluster in each market. The last point in the utility graphs
corresponds to the final utility that the trading agents receive after the market clears, i.e.
trading agents get paid $10 for each security they possess at the end of the market.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 (a-c) show the average utility of the trading agents for cluster 1, 2,
and 3 correspondingly in the American Idol and the Best Picture markets. While Figures
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Figure 4.7: Average utilities of traders in Intrade markets and trading agents in
POSGI prediction markets for clusters 1 (a), 2 (b), 3 (c), and 4 (d) in the Recession
market.
4.7 and 4.8 (a-d) show the average utility of the trading agents for cluster 1, 2, 3, and 4
correspondingly in the Recession and the Presidential Election markets. We note that
different clusters have different durations, for example in the Best Picture market, cluster
1 shown in Figure 4.6(a) lasts for only 21 days, whereas cluster 3 shown in Figure 4.6(c)
lasts for the entire duration of the market. From this set of experiments we observe that
due to the look-ahead capability of the CE strategy the trading agents are able to get more
utility than the human traders in the Intrade markets. A negative trading agents’ utility
throughout most of the duration in some markets is because the agents buy securities at the
beginning of the market’s duration and in the markets(or clusters) with a shorter duration,
such as the American Idol market, they do not have enough time to play the market to
increase their utility until almost the end of the market. However, in the markets with
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Figure 4.8: Average utilities of traders in Intrade markets and trading agents in
POSGI prediction markets for clusters 1 (a), 2 (b), 3 (c), and 4 (d) in the Presidential
Election market.
longer duration the trading agents are able to increase their utility throughout the market’s
duration. In summary of this set of experiments, we observe that using trading agents with
CE strategy to trade on behalf of humans may be beneficial since it leads to higher utility
and it can avoid inefficient human trading decisions that might result in a very large loss,
such as the one observed in the Presidential Election market for cluster 3 shown in Figure
9 (c).
For our next set of experiments, we compare the trading agents’ and market’s behavior
under various strategies employed by the trading agents in Intrade’s markets given in Table
4.2. In this set of experiments in each run of each market all agents use the same trading
strategy. We then compare separate runs with different strategies. We use the following
five well-known strategies [67] for comparison with our proposed CE strategy.
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a. ZI (Zero Intelligence) - each agent submits randomly calculated quantity to buy or
sell.
b. ZIP (Zero Intelligence Plus) - each agent selects a quantity to buy or sell that satisfies
a particular level of profit by adopting its profit margin based on past prices.
c. CP (by Preist and Tol) - each agent adjusts its quantity to buy or sell based on past
prices and tries to choose that quantity so that it is competitive among other agents.
d. GD (by Gjerstad and Dickhaut) - each agent maintains a history of past transactions
and chooses the quantity to buy or sell that maximizes its expected utility.
e. DP (Dynamic Programming solution for POSG game) - each agent uses dynamic pro-
gramming solution to find the best quantity to buy or sell that maximizes its expected
utility given past prices, past utility, past belief and the information signal [45].





Table 4.3: Correlation test conducted using two tailed type 3 t-test showing the
correlation of the market prices in the Intrade markets and the market prices produced
by LMSR in POSGI prediction markets.
In order to compare the effect of different trading strategies on the market prices, in
the remaining set of experiments we have LMSR market maker calculate the market price
and send the LMSR market price back to the trading agents instead of the Intrade’s market
price. We first compare the market prices calculated by LMSR market maker and the real
Intrade’s market prices. The results of the t-test shown in Table 4.3 indicate a strong
correlation between the two market prices for all four markets.
Figures 4.9 (a) column show the market prices calculated by the LMSR market maker
for four Intrade markets. We observe that agents using the CE strategy are able to trade
at prices that are closer to the final outcome of the event, indicating that agents using
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Figure 4.9: The market prices(a) and the average utilities(b) of the agents under
different trading strategies for American Idol market, Best Picture market, Recession
market, and Presidential Election market (top to bottom).
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the CE strategy are able to respond to other agents’ strategies and predict the aggregated
price of the security more efficiently. This efficiency is further supported by the graph in
Figures 4.9(b) column that show the utilities of the agents while using different strategies.
The agent population was uniformly divided for different strategies. We see that the agents
using the CE strategy are able to obtain 39% more utility on average than the agents
following the next best performing strategy (DP) and 137% more utility on average than
the agents following the worst performing strategy (ZI) in all markets. Overall, we can say
that using the POSGI model allows the agent to avoid myopically predicting prices and use
the correlated equilibrium to calculate prices more accurately and obtain higher utilities.
In summary, the POSGI model and the CE strategy proposed in this chapter of the
thesis result in better price tracking and higher utilities because they provide each agent
with a strategic behavior while taking into account the observations of the prediction market
and the new information of the events. The work presented in this part of the thesis was
published in [56] and [54] and the overview of our findings is shown in Table 4.4.
Contr. Research Question Research Findings
2 How do different trading agent - We observed that a higher utility
behaviors affect the behavior of of the trading agents leads to
prediction markets? a more accurate price prediction.
2 What trading strategies - Our proposed strategy based on
perform the best in Correlated Equilibrium was shown
prediction markets? to perform the best.
2 How can prediction markets - By rewarding (paying) trading
incentivize trading agents to agents for useful trades and
participate in order to achieve penalizing them for
a higher prediction accuracy? misleading trades.
2 How does the trader’s behavior - Our experiments and correlated
using a formal game-theoretic model tests show that there is
compare to the trader’s behavior a strong correlation
in real prediction markets? between them.
Table 4.4: Research findings for research questions in contribution 2 of this thesis.
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Chapter 5
A Multi-Agent Prediction Market
Based on Boolean Network
Evolution for Analyzing Market
Dynamics
In this chapter of the thesis, we propose a form of a dynamical system, called a Boolean
Network (BN), that uses simple Boolean rules to model the operation of a prediction market.
We then use this BN-based model to study the overall dynamics of the prediction market
and how various parameters effect its behavior. In a BN, each node is represented by a
binary state while the network edges represent rules that update the state of the node that
the edges are incident on. Although inherently simple, BNs can be used to analyze essential
aspects of complex networks such as values of parameters that effect a specific behavior and
the time required to reach that behavior. It also makes sense to use Boolean networks in the
context of a prediction market because there is a direct correspondence between Boolean
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values output by the Boolean network’s rules and the binary outcomes of events predicted
by a prediction market.
The main contributions of this part of thesis are to develop simple Boolean rules for
updating the beliefs for each of the market’s participants and for aggregating the partici-
pants’ belief information into a single market price. We show that despite the simplification
of the traders’ beliefs in the prediction market into Boolean states, the aggregated market
price calculated using our BN model is strongly correlated with the price calculated by
a commonly used aggregation strategy in existing prediction markets called the Logarith-
mic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR). Our experimental results show that our BN model also
eliminates the problem of frequently fluctuating prices that are known to be a drawback of
the LMSR. We also use our BN model to analyze the dynamics of the prediction market
with respect to different market parameters and determine the conditions under which the
market price converges. Finally, we model the untruthful belief revelation by the market
participants, a commonly encountered problem in prediction markets, using the presence
of noise in the Boolean rules of our prediction market and obtain similar results as the
conventional (non-Boolean) prediction markets. The research questions that we attempt to
answer in this contribution are reproduced below in Table 5.1.
Contr. Research Question Research Approach
3 How does a prediction market evolve Theoretical Examination
and what are its dynamics under different Empirical Analysis
market and trader conditions?
3 How can we make a prediction market Theoretical Examination
unaffected by “noise”? Empirical Analysis
Table 5.1: Research questions that are addressed in contribution 3 of this thesis.
5.1 BN-based Prediction Market
As our previous multi-agent prediction markets, our BN-based prediction market consists
of three major entities: trading agents, a market maker agent, and information sources that
are external to the market but provide information to the market’s agents. Because of the
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Figure 5.1: The sequence of operations done by the trading agents and the market
maker agent in one trading period in a prediction market.
binary nature of the event outcomes, it makes sense to use Boolean functions to represent
the beliefs of the traders in prediction markets [21]. The basic operations of our BN-based
prediction market are based on the traditional prediction market’s operations, however the
trading agents’ beliefs are updated using a Boolean function and a novel technique using the
Boolean beliefs of the trading agents is used to calculate the market price. Figure 5.1 shows
the operation of both the conventional and the BN-based prediction market proposed in this
part of the thesis ∗. To do this, each trading agent maintains a belief about the outcome
of the security corresponding to the event and updates this belief at certain intervals using
the aggregated market price, past belief values and external information. In our BN-based
prediction market each trading agent uses a variable called a state to represent this belief.
Each state can take one of two values: 1 or ON, meaning that the trading agent believes
∗For the simplicity of our discussion and without the loss of generality, we assume there is one
event in our prediction market with two possible outcomes - event happens/does not happen.
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that the event will happen, or 0 or OFF, meaning that the trading agent believes the event
will not happen. Following the belief update rule in a conventional prediction market,
trading agents update the value of their state at each trading period t based on the current
aggregated market price, their past state, and the information signal they receive about the
event. The state update procedure is represented as a Boolean function which is described in
the next section. After the trading agents update their state, they calculate their expected
utility using their past state and the current market price and use this utility to determine
the optimal quantity of each security to buy or sell. The optimal quantity to buy or sell
is given by the quantity that maximizes the expected utility of the trading agent. The
trading agents send the quantity of securities they want to buy or sell and their current
belief/state to the market maker agent. The market maker agent updates the market price
after aggregating the beliefs received from the trading agents. The market maker agent also
calculates the cost of each trading agent’s transaction and sends it back to each trading
agent.
In the next section we describe the Boolean function formulation of the operations
by the trading agents and the market maker agent in a prediction market. A summary
comparison between the operations of our BN-based prediction market and a conventional
(LMSR-based) prediction market is given in Table 5.2.
5.1.1 Trading Agents’ Boolean Belief Update
The state of a trading agent n ∈ N is determined by the three variables defined below:
a. pr(t) - the aggregated market price at trading period t. In our BN-based prediction
market we call the current aggregated market price the density of ones which is the
fraction of trading agents that are in state 1 at a given trading period t.
b. rn(t) - state of the n-th trading agent at trading period t representing its belief about
the outcome of the event.




3 ) - a vector of weights representing the trust that the n-th trading
agent holds for the accuracy of the posted market price, its own past belief, and
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Operation Conventional PM BN-based PM
Belief update 1. Trading agents calculate
their beliefs as a weighted av-
erage of the market price, their
past belief and the information
signal [109] with all the parame-
ters ∈ [0, 1].
1. Trading agents’ beliefs
are represented through their
Boolean states which are up-
dated as a threshold function
of the weighted average of the
market price ∈ [0, 1], their past
Boolean state ∈ {0, 1} and the
Bernoulli information signal ∈
{0, 1}.
2. Trading agents submit their
beliefs as a discrete value ∈
[0, 1].
2. Trading agents send their
belief (i.e. their state) as a
Boolean value ∈ {0, 1}.
Aggregation
rule
3. The market maker uses
some rule such as LMSR to
aggregate the beliefs of the
traders and set the market
price [13].
3. The market maker uses the
fraction of traders that are ON




4. Most prediction markets use
a continuous probability distri-
bution to model the external
information signal.
4. Following [53], we use a
Boolean value for the signal.
Table 5.2: Differences between conventional LMSR-based prediction market and our
BN-based prediction market.
the new information signal it obtains, respectively, following [38]. These trusts are




i = 1, for i = 1, 2, 3.
Let Bn(t) be the information signal received by the n-th trading agent at trading period
t. For simplicity and for the purpose of illustration of this method, we assume that Bn(t)
is the value of a Bernoulli random variable with probability qn of obtaining a 1, that is
positive information, and probability 1− qn of obtaining a 0, that is negative information.
The rule that generates the new state of the n-th trading agent can be written as follows
and is shown as a diagram in Figure 5.2:
rn(t+ 1) =

1 , if wn1 · pr(t) + w
n
2 · rn(t) + w
n
3 · Bn(t) > z,∑3
i=1w
n
i = 1, w
n







new belief = weighted 
average of pr(t), rn(t) 
and Bn(t) 
rn(t+1) 
   = 0 
rn(t+1) 
   = 1 
new belief <= z
new belief > z
Agent n
Figure 5.2: The Boolean belief update used by agent n at trading period t.
Here z ∈ [0, 1] represents a threshold parameter used to convert the quantity wn1 ·pr(t)+
wn2 · rn(t) +w
n
3 ·Bn(t) into a Boolean value. The rule basically says that the trading agent
rn is turned ON at trading period t + 1 if the weighted sum of the market price, its own
past state, and the external information signal is greater than some threshold value z at
trading period t. Thus the trading agent rule is a linear threshold function. The value of
z indicates the boundary between what is considered negative or positive overall impact of
the aggregated information on each trading agent’s belief. For simplicity, we will assume
that z is fixed for all trading agents. Although in real prediction markets different agents
may have different ways of evaluating information and reflecting on their past experiences,
for simplicity we assume that the trust weights wn and the Bernoulli distribution B are
the same for all trading agents. Also, in real prediction markets different trading agents
may have different thresholds or predispositions for believing that an event will take place;
therefore future work will allow for generalizations with varying thresholds. In Section 5.2.1




3 , can be learned using a neural network.
5.1.2 Mean-field Analysis for Calculating the Aggregated Mar-
ket Price by Market Maker agents
The fraction of trading agents in state 1 at trading period t give the aggregated belief of
trading agents that believe the event will happen at trading period t. In our model this
value is represented through the density of ones which is calculated by the market maker
agent. The market maker agent uses a mean-field approach specific to statistical physics to
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generate a recursive mathematical model for the density of ones. The mean-field approach
assumes a sufficiently large number of nodes so that potential local correlations can be
ignored. This makes the computations more manageable.
Let pr(t) be the probability that a (generic) trading agent is ON at trading period t,
and 1 − pr(t) the probability that the trading agent is OFF at trading period t. We find
pr(t + 1) in terms of pr(t), using a probabilistic approach typical for derivations of mean-
field formulae, based on the law of total probability and the assumption of independence
of inputs of the rules governing the dynamics of the prediction market. Since the trust
weights wn and Bernoulli distribution Bn(t) is assumed to be the same for all agents, in the
derivation below we will drop the trading agent index n.
Observe that by the rule of total probability, pr(t+1) = P (r(t+1) = 1) = P (r(t+1) =
1|r(t) = 0)(1 − pr(t)) + P (r(t + 1) = 1|r(t) = 1)pr(t), where P (A) is used to denote the
probability of an event A. We note that












Putting equations (5.2) and (5.3), we get:












To simplify the notation, denote FB(b) = P (B > b), the complementary cumulative
distribution function associated to the random variable B. Then the formula for pr(t+ 1)
becomes













Observe that this formula can be used with both discrete and continuous distributions
for the external information. However, in the numerical investigations we will focus on the
Bernoulli random variable. For the Bernoulli case, we can actually compute the values of
FB according to the relative positions of
z−w1pr(t)−w2
w3
< z−w1pr(t)w3 with respect to the two
possible values of B, namely 0 and 1. Recall that q is the probability that B is 1. By a
straightforward computation we obtain:
pr(t+ 1) =

1, if pr(t) >
z
w1




























The mathematical model for the density of ones not only represents the aggregated
market price but can also be used to analyze the dynamics of the prediction market. Observe
that the function (5.6) represents a map (that is a function whose domain and codomain
are the same) on [0, 1] whose fixed points can be computed. Let us denote it by f(p). A
point p ∈ S is a fixed point of the map f if f(p) = p. It is known from chaos theory that
the fixed points of a map drive the dynamics of the map. More precisely, if say p is a fixed
point of f , then if |f ′(p)| < 1, the fixed point p attracts all other points close enough to p.
More precisely, if x is a point close to p, then fn(x)→ p as n→∞, where fn(x) is the n-th
iterate of f at the point x. The set {x, f(x), f2(x), ..., fn(x), ...} is called the orbit of x. On
the other hand, if |f ′(p)| > 1, the fixed point p repels all the orbits starting at points x in
a neighborhood of p.
We find the fixed points for the map given in (5.6) in our BN-based prediction market
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by setting pr(t + 1) = pr(t). The analysis of the stability of the fixed points of the map
(5.6) reveals that the fixed points 0 and 1 are always stable. On the other hand, if w2 < w3
then there is a third stable point q. The orbits will be attracted to one of these three
fixed points, depending on the parameters. If w2 > w3, we may also end up with the case
where all points in [0, 1] are fixed points, which means that all states are frozen from the




which means w1 + w3 < z < w2. Higher order iterations of the map (5.6) do not reveal
more complexity. Thus, in case the external information is modeled by a Bernoulli random
variable, the behavior of the model is non-complex and can be easily predicted.
5.2 Experimental Results































Figure 5.3: One hidden layer neural network used for learn trust weights.




3 used by the n-th trad-
ing agent’s belief update rule given in Equation 5.1, we use a neural network representation.
We construct a neural network with one hidden layer, where the market price at trading
period t, pr(t), the state of the trading agent at trading period t, rn(t), and the Bernoulli
variable representing the information parameter, Bn(t), are the inputs to the network. The
new state of the trading agent at trading period t+1, rn(t+1), is the output of the neural
network. The representation of the neural network used is shown in Figure 5.3. The initial
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input weights are set randomly, while the learned (output) weights are learned for different
values of the parameters in our BN model, namely z - the threshold parameter, and q - the
probability that the Bernoulli random variable is 1. We use the backpropagation technique
to learn the weights in our neural network [97]. The training set used for the neural network
was obtained by simulating the prediction market for over 200 different combinations of
values of z and q parameters in our BN. For the data generated for the training set pr(t)
was calculated as the fraction of the trading agent nodes that are equal to 1 at time t, rn(t)
was set to 1 if the belief that maximizes the expected utility of the trading agent [34] was
above z and 0 otherwise, and Bn(t) was set to 0 or 1 based on the value of q. A set of
learned weights was generated for each combination of z and q values. The learned values
are used in the numerical investigations given below.
5.2.2 Patterns and validation of the mean-field based price
aggregation mechanism
Having too few trading agents may lead to discrepancies between the mathematical mean-
field model and the actual simulation of prediction market due to the fact that for a mean-
field approximation the prediction market has to be large enough to ignore local correlations.
In our experiments we found that a prediction market with 100 trading agents is sufficiently
large for a good match in the fraction of trading agents that are ON between the mathe-
matical model and the actual network. Therefore, in all of our experimental results except
those presented in Section 5.2.5 we use 100 trading agents. Similar results were obtained
with a larger number of trading agents. We start our experimental analysis by presenting
pattern formation plots generated with a Boolean network governed by the rules presented
in Section 5.1.1. More precisely, pattern formation plots are obtained by arranging the
nodes, representing the trading agents, in a one-dimensional array and numbering them
from left to right. Then we choose an initial state of the prediction market and iterate
it a number of trading periods with time evolving downwards. We plot a black dot when
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Figure 5.4: (a),(c),(e),(g): Pattern Formation plots for a prediction market starting
with a random initial condition and the parameters specified in the associated right
plots. (b),(d),(f),(h): The corresponding aggregated market price. The parameters
are set as specified in the graphs.
pattern formation plots and the corresponding aggregated market price using BN at each
trading period of the prediction market’s evolution. This is done for four distinct parameter
combinations. We can see in Figure 5.4(a), that for a low value of q = 0.3 and a medium
value of z = 0.6 (which means that the most weight is given to the information value), the
aggregated market price oscillates in a narrow range of values around 0.3. The correspond-
ing pattern formation plot in Figure 5.4(b) looks random but with more nodes in state 0
(more neutral dots). Figures 5.4(c) and (d) show similar result for q = 0.7 and z = 0.7.
Here the aggregated market price does not reach stability, but it oscillates within a narrow
range of values around 0.7 and therefore its corresponding pattern has more nodes in state
1 (more black dots). The overall higher values for the aggregated market price are due to
the fact that the probability of information signal being 1 is high (q = 0.7) and the weight
corresponding to the information signal is also high (w3 = 0.8). In Figures 5.4(e) and (f)
the parameters are q = 0.2 and z = 0.8. We can see that the aggregated market price is
stable around 0.7 and thus the pattern is stationary with neutral and black vertical stripes
showing that trading agents are either in state 0 or in state 1 throughout the prediction
market’s duration. Finally, for the parameters q = 0.2, z = 0.2 in Figure 5.4(g) and (h) it
takes less than 25 trading periods for the aggregated market price to reach stability. This
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w1=0.6, w2=0.1, w3=0.3; q=0.45; z=0.5.































w1=0.3, w2=0.3, w3=0.4; q=0.3; z=0.3.





















Figure 5.5: The system (blue dots) versus the mathematical model (red circles) for
the 1st, 5th, and 20th trading periods. Note the apparent match between them.
can be seen more clearly from the pattern formation plot where the top of the plot shows
clear randomness, while the rest of the plot is black meaning all of the trading agents are
in state 1. The aggregated market price is able to converge here mostly because of the low
value of the threshold parameter z. Thus from these results we can see that the aggregated
market price can be used as a predictor for future market dynamics. It can also estimate
the trading period needed to reach a certain type of long-term behavior, e.g. convergence.
We now check that the mean-field model for the aggregated market price, pr(t), derived
in Equation (5.5) is a good approximation for the fraction of nodes in state 1 obtained by
evolving the actual BN. We do this by graphing on the same plot both pr(t) and the actual
fraction of trading agents in state 1 for the 1st, 5th, and the 20th trading periods as shown
in Figure 5.5. On the x-axis we plot the initial conditions for the fraction of trading agents
in state 1 ({0, 1N ,
2
N , ..., ,
(N−1)
N }), representing how many traders are initially in state 1, i.e.
believe that the event will happen. We first apply the mathematical model to each of these
initial conditions, iterate them, and plot the results with a red straight line. We then apply
the prediction market evolution for a network state corresponding to each initial fraction
of the trading agents in state 1, evolve the prediction market, and plot it with a blue ‘+’.
For each given initial fraction of ones we randomly select trading agents that are in state 1.















































































































Figure 5.6: Graphical illustration of the iterations of the aggregated market price
(density of ones map given in Equation 5.6) (blue ‘+’) versus the main diagonal (red
line). The intersection between them yields the fixed points of the map.
w, q, and z. We performed exhaustive simulations for the possible ranges of q, z, and their
corresponding weights learned via neural network, and obtained similar results to those in
Figure 5.5. We can see from Figure 5.5 that the first iteration matches perfectly. Then, as
the prediction market and the mathematical model evolve during their transient phase, the
match becomes a little less perfect due to the actual correlations that are building up in a
prediction market. These correlations are ignored in the mean-field approach. Despite the
assumption of no correlations, in the long run the mathematical model for pr(t) is a very
good approximation of the evolution of the aggregated market price for the actual network.
We also illustrate the behavior of our mean-field based model for the aggregated market
price using BN by generating multiple iterations of the mathematical model for pr(t + 1)
(blue line marked with ‘+’) for various values of q and z in Figure 5.6. We also plot the
line representing pr(t + 1) = pr(t) (red straight line). Note that the intersection of each





















































Figure 5.7: Comparison of the market prices set by LMSR (marked by ‘x’ - blue) and
the aggregated market price using BN (marked by ‘⋄’ - red) by trading periods. Note
the similarities between the two models, as well as the robustness of the BN model
as opposed to the increased variation of the LMSR model.
our system has fixed points (when pr(t + 1) = pr(t)) at 0, 1 and q. We find that our
prediction market mainly conforms to one of four behaviors shown in Figure 5.6. Figure
5.6(a) shows the case when the system converges to 1, while Figure 5.6(b) illustrates the
case when the prediction market converges to 0, and Figure 5.6(c) shows the existence of
the fixed point at q. Figure 5.6(d) shows the last case when pr(t + 1) = pr(t), so the two
lines overlap, meaning chaos.
5.2.3 Comparison to Conventional Prediction Markets
In this section we compare the aggregated market price obtained using the BN-based pre-
diction market model to the aggregated market price obtained with a Logarithmic Market
Scoring Rule (LMSR) aggregation mechanism [13] while using the same underlying parame-
ters. To illustrate the comparison we graph both market prices on the same plot for different
values of q and z. The x-axis represents the number of trading periods, while the y-axis is
the market price. We can see from Figure 5.7 that in the long run, both the LMSR and BN
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models yield approximately the same results. It is also revealed that the aggregated market
price does not fluctuate as much as the LMSR price, which is a known and reported problem
of the LMSR pricing [85]. We also note in Table 5.3 that the correlation coefficients between
the data from the LMSR and BN models are fairly close to 1, revealing a strong correlation











Table 5.3: Correlations between the LMSR market price and the aggregated market
price using BN from Figure 5.7. Observe that the numbers are fairly close to 1 which
indicates a significant correlation between the LMSR and BN models.
5.2.4 Robustness to noise
It is known that real networks (biological/genetic, physical, neural, chemical, social, finan-
cial etc.) are always subject to disturbances and have the ability to reach functional diversity
and aim to maintain the same state under environmental noise. Prediction markets can also
be affected by some disturbances in the form of manipulation by the trading agents that
reveal their beliefs untruthfully. For example, in the Tradesports 2004 presidential markets
there was an apparent manipulation effort. An anonymous trader sold many securities cor-
responding to the event “George W. Bush will win the 2004 Presidential elections” at a
very low value. This caused the market price to be driven to zero, implying a zero percent
chance of the event happening. However, this manipulation effort failed, as the market
price of the security related to this event rebounded rapidly to its previous level [110]. As






















































































(d)   
Figure 5.8: Iterations of the noisy aggregated market price (blue ‘+’) with j = 10
versus the main diagonal (red line). We used the same parameters as in Figure 5.6.
it is likely that some individuals or groups will be motivated to manipulate them. Inducing
disturbance in the system by changing the value of certain nodes in the network (according
to a deterministic or stochastic rule) is a good model for an environmental or intrinsic type
of perturbation. A similar procedure has been used for example by Bilke and Sjunnesson [7]
where one randomly chosen variable is inverted after the system has reached a limit cycle
in the Kauffman model, or by Goodrich and Matache [39] who show that the introduction
of noise can stabilize a certain type of BN for a wide range of parameters. We analyze
the response to disturbances of the prediction market in this chapter under a simple noise
process to assess the robustness of the BN-based model to potential non-truthful trading
agents.
We employ the following noise procedure, called the “flip rule”: at each trading period
t we randomly select j trading agents and flip their state before applying the Boolean rule.
This procedure has been used in [39]. Since the number of zeros and ones changes due to
the perturbation, the value of pr(t) is modified prior to the application of the model (5.5).
Now, if j nodes are chosen at random, then j · pr(t) of them are in state 1 and j · (1− pr(t))
are in state 0. By the flip rule, the total number of trading agents in state 1 is decreased
by j · pr(t) since they are changed to 0. On the other hand, the number is increased by
j · (1−pr(t)) since the zeros become ones. Thus, the proportion of trading agents in state 1,
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N = pr(t) +
j
N (1− 2pr(t)). Clearly this number
is in [0, 1]. Then the formula (5.5) can be written as follows:
pr(t+ 1) = (5.7)
FB
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z − w1(pr(t) +
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Figure 5.8 illustrates iteration plots analog to those in Figure 5.6 (for the same parameter
values), but with induced perturbations. These results show that the noise generated by
the “flip rule” can stabilize the prediction market as seen from the Figure 5.8(d). In that
case the prediction market was chaotic without noise, and now it stabilizes around 0.5. This
result supports the result obtained by Hanson [48], where he showed that the manipulator
in the prediction market can aid its accuracy. For other parameter combinations, noise
may change the value of the fixed points, maintaining stability, as can be seen in the other
plots of Figure 5.8. The fixed points changed from 1 to 0.9 (Figure 5.8(a)), and from 0.5
to 0.4 (Figure 5.8(c)). In Figure 5.9 we show similar iteration plots but for parameter
combinations that yield piecewise functions. We note that there may be multiple fixed
points this time. However, all of them are stable since the derivative at those points is
always less than 1. Therefore, the stability of the prediction market is either preserved or
induced by the introduction of noise.
5.2.5 Scalability
In this section we test the scalability of our prediction market and analyze how the changes
in the number of trading agents affect the dynamics of the prediction market. Figure 5.10




















































































































(c)   
Figure 5.9: Iterations of the noisy aggregated market price (blue ‘+’) with j = 5
versus the main diagonal (red line). Note that these parameter values yield piecewise












































































Figure 5.10: The system (blue dots) versus the mathematical model (red circles)
under “flip” noise procedure for 50, 500, 1000, 5000 trading agents for the 1st, 5th,
and 20th trading periods. The parameters are fixed as follows: w1 = 0.1, w2 =


















































Number of Trading Periods
Figure 5.11: The aggregated market price by time steps, for different trader popula-
tion sizes.
improves as the number of trading agents increases. This is expected, since a mean-field
formula is valid in the limit N →∞. Figure 5.11 shows the aggregated market price using
a BN for 50, 100, 500, 1000, 5000, and 10000 trading agents for q = 0.7, z = 0.7, w1, w2, w3 =
0.1, 0.1, 0.8. This combination of z and q parameters yields a more dynamic behavior of the
prediction market as seen in Figure 5.4 (c,d), however here we can see that as the number of
trading agents increase the aggregated market price becomes less dynamic. However, there
is not much difference in the market price dynamics when N = 5000 and when N = 10000,
leading us to believe that in this case 5000 trading agents are enough to lead to an accurate
prediction market.
In summary, in this chapter we showed that the BN approach gives results similar
to the LMSR model with less fluctuations of the market price. In addition to proposing
a new method to calculate the aggregated market price using BN and mean-field based
mathematical modeling, we also showed how it can be used to analyze and predict the
dynamics of the prediction market. The work presented in this chapter was published in [60]
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and the overview of our findings is shown in Table 5.4.
Contr. Research Question Research Findings
3 How does a prediction market - Our BN-based prediction market
evolve and what are its dynamics conforms to 4 distinct behaviors
under different market depending on parameters’ values.
and trader conditions? - The market price can be used as a
predictor for future market dynamics.
- Our BN-based model can be used
to determine how many traders
are sufficient for an accurate prediction.
3 How can we make a prediction - We find that within our BN-based
unaffected by “noise”? model the noise does not decrease
the accuracy of the market.







In this chapter we tackle the problem of using prediction markets for decision making.
Accurate information aggregation about uncertain events is very important for a decision
maker. However, there has not been much effort in combining information aggregation and
decision making. We consider the information aggregation problem with a decision maker
in the multi-sensor domain. Multi-sensor fusion is concerned with the problem of fusing
data from multiple sensors in order to make a more accurate estimation of the environment,
and has been a central research topic in sensor-based systems [107]. Our work in this chapter
is based on the insight that the problem addressed by prediction markets of aggregating
the beliefs of different humans to forecast the outcome of an initially unknown event is
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analogous to the problem in multi-sensor fusion of fusing information from multiple sources
to predict the outcome of an initially unknown object.
Recently several multi-agent techniques [105] have been proposed to address the multi-
sensor fusion problem. Most of the solutions for multi-sensor information fusion and pro-
cessing are based on Bayesian inference techniques [68;80;96]. While such techniques have
been shown to be very effective, we investigate a complimentary problem where sensors can
behave in a self-interested manner. Such self-interested behavior can be motivated by the
sensors that deliberately misreport to save power, CPU cycles and memory (for example, to
devote more resources to other tasks), and therefore always behave in a way that maximize
their own benefits [72;95]. Moreover, these sensors may be programmed by different people
and the assumption of full cooperation may not always hold [101]. To address this problem,
we develop a multi-agent prediction market for multi-sensor information fusion that in-
cludes a utility driven mechanism to motivate each sensor, through its associated agent, to
reveal accurate reports. Besides being an efficient aggregation mechanism, using prediction
markets gives us several useful features - a mathematical formulation called a scoring rule
that deters self-interested sensors from misreporting information, a regression-based belief
update mechanism for the sensor agents for incorporating the aggregated beliefs (or infor-
mation estimates) of other sensors into their own calculation, and the ability to incorporate
an autonomous decision maker that uses expert-level domain knowledge to make utility
maximizing decisions to deploy additional sensors appropriately to improve the detection
of an object. Our experimental results illustrated with a landmine detection scenario while
using identical data distributions and settings, show that the information fusion performed
using our technique reduces the root mean squared error by 5 − 13% as compared to a
previously studied technique for landmine data fusion using the Dempster-Shafer theory [73]
and by 3− 8% using distributed data fusion technique [70]. The research questions that we
try to answer in this contribution are reproduced below in Table 6.1.
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Contr. Research Question Research Approach
4 How can prediction markets be used for Design and Development
decision making? Theoretical Examination
4 Is there an advantage of using prediction Empirical Analysis
markets for sensor fusion?
4 Can a prediction market-based model for
sensor fusion be effective in realistic Empirical Analysis
settings given various limitations?
Table 6.1: Research questions that are addressed in contribution 4 of this thesis.
6.1 Problem Formulation
To motivate our problem we describe a distributed automated landmine detection scenario
used for humanitarian demining. An environment contains different buried objects, some
of which could potentially be landmines. A set of robots, each equipped with one of three
types of landmine detection sensor such as a metal detector (MD), or a ground penetrating
radar (GPR) or an infra-red (IR) heat sensor, are deployed into this environment. Each
robot is capable of perceiving certain features of a buried object through its sensor such as
the object’s metal content, area, burial depth, etc. However, the sensors give noisy readings
for each perceived feature depending on the characteristics of the object as well as on the
characteristics of the environment (e.g., moisture content, ambient temperature, sunlight,
etc.). Consequently, a sensor that works well in one scenario, fails to detect landmines
in a different scenario, and, instead of a single sensor, multiple sensors of different types,
possibly with different detection accuracies can detect landmines with higher certainty [41].
Within this scenario, the central question that we intend to answer is: given an initial set of
reports from self-interested sensors about the features of a buried object, what is a suitable
set (number and type) of sensors to deploy over a certain time window to the object, so
that, over this time window, the fused information from the different sensors successively
reduces the uncertainty in determining the object’s type.
Let L be a set of objects. Each object has certain features that determine its type.
We assume that there are f different features and m different object types. Let Φ =
{φ1, φ2, ..., φf} denote the set of object features and Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θm} denote the set of
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object types. The features of an object l ∈ L is denoted by lΦ ⊆ Φ and its type is denoted
by lθ ∈ Θ. lΦ can be perceived, albeit with measurement errors, through sensors, and, our
objective is to determine lθ as accurately as possible from the perceived but noisy values
of lΦ. Let ∆(Θ) = {(δ(θ1), δ(θ2), ..., δ(θm)) : δ(θi) ∈ [0, 1],
∑m
i=1 δ(θi) = 1}, denote the set
of probability distributions over the different object types. For convenience of analysis, we
assume that when the actual type of object l, lθ = θj, its (scalar) type is expanded into a m-
dimensional probability vector using the function vec : Θ → [0, 1]m : vecj = 1, veci 6=j = 0,
which has 1 as its j-th component corresponding to l’s type θj and 0 for all other components.
Let A denote a set of agents (sensors) and At,lrep ⊆ A denote the subset of agents that are
able to perceive the object l’s features on their sensors at time t. Based on the perceived
object features, agent a ∈ At,lrep at time t reports a belief as a probability distribution over
the set of object types, which is denoted as ba,t,l ∈ ∆(Θ). The beliefs of all the agents
are combined into a composite belief, Bt,l = Agg
a∈At,lrep(b
a,t,l), and let Θˆt,l : Bt,l → ∆(Θ)
denote a function that computes a probability distribution over object types based on the
aggregated agent beliefs. Within this setting we formulate the object classification problem
as a decision making problem in the following manner: given an object l and an initial
aggregated belief Bt,l calculated from one or more agent reports for that object, determine
a set of additional agents (sensors) that need to be deployed at object l such that the





, for t = 1, 2, ....T , (6.1)
where T is the time window for classifying an object l and RMSE is the root mean square
error given by RMSE(x,y) = ||x−y||√
m
. In other words, at every time step t, the decision
maker tries to select a subset of agents such that the root mean square error (RMSE)
between the estimated type of object l and its actual type is successively minimized. The
major components of the object classification problem described above consists of two parts:
integrating the reports from the different sensors and making sensor deployment decisions
based on those reports so that the objective function given in Equation 6.1 is satisfied.
To address the first part, we have used distributed information aggregation with a multi-
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Figure 6.1: The different components of the prediction market for decision making
and the interactions between them.
agent prediction market, while for the latter we have used an expected utility maximizing
decision-making framework. A schematic showing the different components of our system
and their interactions is shown in Figure 6.1 and explained in the following sections.
6.1.1 Sensor Agents
As mentioned in Section 6.1, there is a set of robots in the scenario and each robot has
an on-board sensor for analyzing the objects in the scenario. Different robots can have
different types of sensors and sensors of the same type can have different degrees of accuracy
determined by their cost. Every sensor is associated with a software agent that runs on-
board the robot and performs calculations related to the data sensed by the robot’s sensor.
In the rest of this chapter, we have used the terms sensor and agent interchangeably. For
the ease of notation, we drop the subscript l corresponding to an object for the rest of this
section. When an object is within the sensing range of a sensor (agent) a at time t, the
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sensor observes the object’s features and its agent receives this observation in the form of an
information signal ga,t =< g1, ..., gf > that is drawn from the space of information signals
G ⊆ ∆(Θ). The conditional probability distribution of object type θj given an information
signal g ∈ G, P (θj |g) : G → [0, 1], is constructed using domain knowledge
[24;73;74] within
a Bayesian network and is made available to each agent. Agent a then updates its belief
distribution ba,t using the following equation:
ba,t = wbel ·P(Θ|g
a,t) + (1− wbel) ·B
t, (6.2)
where Bt is the belief value vector aggregated from all sensor reports.
Agent Rewards. Agents behave in a self-interested manner to ensure that they give
their ‘best’ report using their available resources including sensor, battery power, etc. An
agent a that submits a report at time t, uses its belief distribution ba,t to calculate the
report ra,t =< ra,t1 , ..., r
a,t
m >∈ ∆(Θ). An agent can have two strategies to make this report
- truthful or untruthful. If the agent is truthful, its report corresponds to its belief, i.e.,
ra,t = ba,t. But if it is untruthful, it deliberately reports an inaccurate belief to save its
belief computation costs. Each agent a can update its report ra,t within the time window
T by obtaining new measurements from the object and using Equation 6.2 to update its
belief. The report from an agent a at time t is analyzed by a human or agent expert [73] to
assign a weight wa,t depending on the current environment conditions and agent a’s sensor
type’s accuracy under those environment conditions (e.g., rainy weather reduces the weight
assigned to the measurement from an IR heat sensor, or, soil that is high in metal content
reduces the weight assigned to the measurement from an metal detector).
To motivate an agent to submit reports, an agent a gets an instantaneous reward,
ρa,t, from the market maker for the report ra,t it submits at time t, corresponding to its
instantaneous utility, which is given by the following equation:
ρa,t = V (nt
′=1..t)− Ca(ra,t), (6.3)
where V (nt
′=1..t) is the value for making a report with nt
′=1..t being the number of times the
agent a submitted a report up to time t, and, Ca(ra,t) is the cost of making report ra,t for
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agent a. Ca(ra,t) is equal to the actual cost of resources used by the robot, such as expended
time, battery power, etc. if the agent uses truthful strategy, and it is equal to some value
cǫ << actual cost of resources if the agent uses untruthful strategy. We denote the agent’s
value for each report V (nt
′=1..t) as a constant-valued function up to a certain threshold
and a linearly decreasing function thereafter, to de-incentivize agents from making a large
number of reports. Agent a’s value function is given by the following equation:
V (nt
′=1..t) =





where ν ∈ Z+, is a constant value that a gets by submitting reports up to a threshold,
nthreshold is the threshold corresponding to the number of reports a can submit before its
report’s value starts decreasing, and, nmax is the maximum number of reports agent a can
submit before V becomes negative. Finally, to determine its strategy while submitting its
report, an agent selects the strategy that maximizes its expected utility obtained from its
cumulative reward given by Equation 6.3 plus an expected value of its final reward payment
if it continues making similar reports up to the object’s time window T .
6.1.2 Decision Maker Agent
The decision maker agent’s task is to use the composite belief about an object’s type,
Bt, given by the prediction market, and take actions to deploy additional robots(sensors)
based on the value of the objective function given in Equation 6.1. Let AC denote a
set of possible actions corresponding to deploying a certain number of robots, and D =
{d1, ...dh} : di ∈ Ac ⊆ AC denote the decision set of the decision maker, where h is the
number of decisions the decision maker has. The decision function of the decision maker
is given by dec : ∆(Θ) → D. Let udecj ∈ R
m be the utility that the decision maker
receives by determining an object to be of type θj and let P (di|θj) be the probability that
the decision maker makes decision di ∈ D given object type θj. P (di|θj) and u
dec
j are
constructed using domain knowledge [24;73;74]. Given the aggregated belief distribution Bt
102




j=1 P (di|θj) · u
dec
j · B
t. The decision that the decision maker takes at
time t, also called its decision rule, is the one that maximizes its expected utility and is




A conventional prediction market uses the aggregated beliefs of the market’s participants or
traders about the outcome of a future event, to predict the event’s outcome. The outcome of
an event is represented as a binary variable (event happens/does not happen). The traders
observe information related to the event and report their beliefs, as probabilities about the
event’s outcome. The market maker aggregates the traders’ beliefs and uses a scoring rule
to determine a payment or payoff that will be received by each reporting trader. In our
multi-agent prediction market, traders correspond to sensor agents, the market maker agent
automates the calculations on behalf of the conventional market maker, and, an event in
the conventional market corresponds to identifying the type of a detected object. The time
window T over which an object is sensed is called the duration of the object in the market.
This time window is divided into discrete time steps, t = 1, 2, ..., T . During each time step,
each sensor agent observing the object submits a report about the object’s type to the
market maker agent. The market maker agent performs two functions with these reports.
First, at each time step t, it aggregates the agent reports into an aggregated belief about the
object, Bt ∈ ∆(Θ). Secondly, it calculates and distributes payments for the sensor agents.
It pays an immediate but nominal reward to each agent for its report at time step t using
Equation 6.3. Finally, at the end of the object’s time window T , the market maker also
gives a larger payoff to each agent that contributed towards classifying the object’s type.
The calculations and analysis related to these two functions of the market maker agent are
described in the following sections.
Final Payoff Calculation. The payoff calculation for a sensor agent is performed by
the market maker using a decision scoring rule at the end of the object’s time window. A
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decision scoring rule [12] is defined as any real valued function that takes the agents’ reported
beliefs, the realized outcome and the decisions made by the decision maker as input, and
produces a payoff for the agent for its reported beliefs, i.e. S : ∆(Θ) × Θ × D −→ R.
We design a scoring rule for decision making that is based on how much agent a’s final
report helped the decision maker to make the right decisions throughout the duration of
the prediction market and by how close the agent a’s final report is to actual object type.
Our proposed scoring rule for decision making given that object’s true type is θj is given in
Equation 6.4:
S(ra,tj , d






where, ra,tj is the reported belief that agent a submitted at time t for object type θj, d
[1:t] is
the set consisting of all the decisions that the decision maker took related to the object up





measures the goodness of the report at time t relative to the true
object type θj, and, ̟(d
[1:t], θj) is the weight, representing how good all the decisions the
decision maker took up to time t were compared to the true object type θj. ̟(d
[1:t], θj)
is determined by the decision maker and made available to the agents through the market
maker. We assume that ̟(d[1:t], θj) =
∑t
i=1 P (di | θj)·u
dec
j , which gives the expected utility
of the decision maker agent for making decision i when the true type of the object is θj.
Aggregation. Since a sensor agent gets paid both through its immediate rewards for
making reports during the object’s time window and through the scoring rule function for
decision making at the end of the object’s time window, we define the total payment that
the agent has received by the end of the object’s time window as a payment function.
Definition 1. A function Ψ(ra,t, d[1:t], θj , n
t′=1..t) is called a payment function if each
agent a’s total received payment at the end of the object’s time window (when t = T ) is




ρa,k + S(ra,tj , d
[1:t], θj) (6.5)
where ρa,k, S(ra,tj , d
[1:t], θj) and their components are defined as in Equations 6.3 and 6.4.
Let Ψave denote a weighted average of the payment function in Equation 6.5 over all
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where Atrep is the subset of agents that are able to perceive object feature at time t and
wa,k is the weight assigned to agent a at time k by the expert. To calculate an aggregated
belief value in a prediction market, Hanson [47] used the generalized inverse function of the
scoring rule. Likewise, we calculate the aggregated belief for our market maker agent by





















where Btj ∈ B
t is the j-th component of the aggregated belief for object type θj. The
aggregated belief vector, Bt, calculated by the market maker agent is sent to the decision
maker agent so that it can calculate its expected utility given in Section 6.1.2, as well as,
sent back to each sensor agent that reported the object’s type till time step t, so that the
agent can refine its future reports, if any, using this aggregate of the reports from other
agents. We also note that the aggregation mechanism used by our market maker is similar
to an LMSR technique which was shown to lead to Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
when, like in our setting, the information signals of the traders are independent conditional
on the state of the world [18].
6.3 Payment function: Properties and Character-
istics
In this section we first show that the payment function is proper, or incentive compatible.
Then we show that when the market maker uses this payment function to reward each agent
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for its reported beliefs, reporting beliefs truthfully is the optimal strategy for each agent.
We can characterize a proper payment function similar to a proper scoring rule.
Definition 2. A payment function Ψ is proper, or incentive compatible, if
Ψ(ba,t, d[1:t], θj , n
t′=1..t) ≥ Ψ(ra,t, d[1:t], θj , n
t′=1..t), (6.8)
∀ba,t, ra,t ∈ ∆(O). Ψ is strictly proper if the inequality in Equation 6.8 strict.
Payment functions can be shown to be proper by representing them using convex func-
tions [12]. To show that our payment function in Equation 6.5 is proper, we characterize it
in terms of a convex function, as shown below:
Theorem 2. A payment function Ψ is proper for decision making if
Ψ(ra,t, d[1:t], θj, n





where G(ra,t) is a convex function and G′(ra,t) is a subgradient of G at point ra,t and
P (di|θj) > 0.
Proof. Consider a payment function Ψ satisfying Equation 6.9. We will show that Ψ
must be proper for decision making. We will drop the agent and time subscripts in
this proof, and also we will write Ψ(r, d[1:t]) (or its element Ψ(rj , di|θj)) instead of full























G′i,j(b)bj = G(b) −G
′(b) · b+G′(b) · b = G(b).

















= G(r) −G′(r)(b − r) ≤ G(b) = EU(b,b).
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Thus, Ψ is a proper payment function for decision making. Ψ is strictly proper payment
function and the inequality is strict if G is a strictly convex function.
Proposition 2. The payment function given in Equation 6.5 is proper.
Proof. Let G(b) = EU(b,b) and G′i,j(b) = P (di|θj)Ψ(b, d
[1:t], θj, n
t′=1..t). Then the pay-
ment function can be written in the form given in Equation 6.9 from Theorem 2. Therefore,
the payment function Ψ given in Equation 6.5 is a proper payment function.

















Ψ(b, d[1:t], θj , n
t′=1..t) · P (di|θj)
P (di|θj)
= Ψ(b, d[1:t], θj, n
t′=1..t).
Agent Reporting Strategy. Assume that agent a’s report at time t is its final report,
then its utility function can be written as ua,tj =
∑t
k=1 ρ
a,k + S(ra,tj , d
[1:t], θj). Then, agent
a’s expected utility for object type θj given its reported belief for object type θj, r
a,t
j , and
its true belief about object type θj, b
a,t


























where P (di|θj) is the probability that the decision maker takes decision di when the object’s
type is θj.
Proposition 3. If agent a is paid according to Ψ, then it reports its beliefs about the object
types truthfully.
Proof. The proof is a straight forward solution to expected utility maximization problem.







































































ra,tj + 1 = 0.

















foreach timestep t do
if object is within sensing range of a then
1. receive observation signals;
2. update belief using Eqn. 6.2;
3. calculate expected utility using Eqn. 6.10;
4. choose report ra,t that maximizes expected utility;
5. send ra,t to the decision maker;





observe the decision dt made by the decision maker;
get the aggregated belief distribution Bt from the market maker agent;




Algorithm 2: Algorithm used by agent a to select and submit reports
6.4 Experimental Results
We have conducted several experiments using our aggregation technique for decision-making
within a multi-sensor landmine detection scenario. Our environment contains different
buried objects, some of which are landmines. The true types of the objects are randomly
determined at the beginning of the simulation. Due to the scarcity of real data related to
landmine detection, we have used the domain knowledge that was reported in [24;73;74] to de-
termine object types, object features, sensor agents’ reporting costs, decision maker agent’s
decision set, decision maker agent’s utility of determining objects of different types, and,
to construct the probability distributions for P (θj |g) and P (di|θj). We report simulation
results for root mean squared error (RMSE) defined in Section 6.1 and also for number of
sensors over time, cost over object types, and average utility of the sensors over time.
Since the focus of our work is on the quality of information fusion, we will concentrate
on describing the results for one object. We assume that there are robots with three types of
sensors, MD (least operation cost, most noisy), IR (intermediate operation cost, moderately
noisy), and GPR (expensive operation cost, most accurate). Initially, the object is detected
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Decision P (di|θ0) P (di|θ1) P (di|θ2)
d1(MD) 0.6 0.4 0
d2(IR) 0.5 0.3 0.2
d3(GPR) 0.4 0.3 0.3
d4(MD,IR) 0.7 0.25 0.05
d5(MD,GPR) 0.6 0.35 0.05
d6(IR,GPR) 0.5 0.3 0.2
d7(MD,MD,IR) 0.8 0.2 0
d8(MD,MD,GPR) 0.75 0.2 0.05
d9(IR,IR,MD) 0.7 0.3 0
d10(IR,IR,GPR) 0.6 0.3 0.1
d11(GPR,GPR,MD) 0.6 0.3 0.1
d12(GPR,GPR,IR) 0.5 0.3 0.2
d13(MD,IR,GPR) 0.9 0.1 0
Table 6.2: P (di|θj) values used for our simulation experiments.
Features Meaning Possible values Sensors able to
provide readings
F1 Metallic content 0(low), 1(high) MD
F2 Area of the object 0(small), 1(large) MD, GPR, IR
F3 Depth of the object 0(shallow), 1(deep) MD, GPR
F4 Position of the sensor 0(near), 1(far) MD, GPR, IR
Table 6.3: Object features used in our simulation experiments.
using one MD sensor. Once the object is detected for the first time, the time window in the
prediction market for identifying the object’s type starts. The MD sensor sends its report to
the market maker in the prediction market and the decision maker makes its first decision
based on this one report. We assume that decision maker’s decision (sent to the robot/sensor
scheduling algorithm in Figure 6.1) is how many (0 − 3) and what type (MD,IR,GPR) of
sensors to send to the site of the detected object subsequently. We have considered a set
of 13 out of all the possible decisions under this setting as can be seen from Table 6.2.
From [74], we derive four object features given in Table 6.3, which are metallic content, area
of the object, depth of the object, and the position of the sensor. Combinations of the
values of these four features constitute the signal set G and at each time step, a sensor
perceiving the object receives a signal g ∈ G. The value of the signal also varies based on
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the robot/sensor’s current position relative to the object. We assume that the identification
of an object stops and the object type is revealed when either Btj ≥ 0.95, for any j, or after
10 time steps, or when there are no more sensors left. The default values for all domain
related parameters are shown in Table 6.3 and the probability values, P (θj |g) and P (di|θj),
are given in Tables 6.5 and 6.2 correspondingly. All of our results were averaged over 10
runs and the error bars indicate the standard deviation over the number of runs.
Name Value
Object types mine(θ0), metallic object(θ1)(non-mine),
non-metallic object(θ2)(non-mine)
Features metallic content, object’s area,
object’s depth, sensor’s position
Sensor types MD, IR, GPR
Max no. of sensors 10
Max no. of decisions 14
T (object identif-n window) 10
ν (agent’s value if 5
nt
′=1..t ≤ nthreshold)
nmax (max no. of 20
reports before value
is negative)
nthreshold (no. of reports before 5
agent’s value < ν)
Table 6.4: Parameters used for our simulation experiments.
For our first group of experiments we analyze the performance of our technique w.r.t.
the variables in our model, such as wbel and time, and, w.r.t. to sensor and object types. We
assume that there are a total of 5 MD sensors, 3 IR sensors, and 2 GPR sensors available
to the decision maker for classifying this object. We observe that as more information gets
sensed for the object, the RMSE value, shown in Figure 6.2(a), decreases over time. It
takes on average 6 − 8 time steps to predict the object type with 95% or greater accuracy
depending on the object type and the value of wbel. We also observe that our model performs
the best with wbel = 0.5 (in Equation 6.2), when the agent equally incorporates its private
signal and also the market’s aggregated belief at each time step into its own belief update.
Figure 6.2(b) shows the average utility of the agents based on their type. We can see that
111
g F1 F2 F3 F4 P (θ0|g) P (θ1|g) P (θ2|g)
g0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.6
g1 0 0 0 1 0.15 0.35 0.5
g2 0 0 1 0 0.1 0.4 0.5
g3 0 0 1 1 0.15 0.4 0.45
g4 0 1 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.5
g5 0 1 0 1 0.15 0.4 0.45
g6 0 1 1 0 0.05 0.35 0.6
g7 0 1 1 1 0.1 0.4 0.5
g8 1 0 0 0 0.7 0.25 0.05
g9 1 0 0 1 0.6 0.3 0.1
g10 1 0 1 0 0.55 0.35 0.1
g11 1 0 1 1 0.5 0.35 0.15
g12 1 1 0 0 0.6 0.3 0.1
g13 1 1 0 1 0.5 0.35 0.15
g14 1 1 1 0 0.45 0.45 0.1
g15 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.4 0.2
Table 6.5: P (θ|g) values used for our simulation experiments.








































Figure 6.2: RMSE for different values of wbel(a), Average sensors’ utilities for different
sensor types(b).
MD sensors get more utility because their costs of calculating and submitting reports are
generally less, whereas GPR sensors get the least utility because they encounter the highest
cost. This result is further verified in Figure 6.3(a) where we can see the costs based on
sensor types and also based on object types. We observe that detecting a metallic object
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Figure 6.3: Cost for different object types(c), RMSE for sensors’ reports averaged
over sensor types(d).
that is not a mine has the highest cost. We posit that it is because both MD and IR sensors
can detect metallic content in the object and extra cost is due to the time and effort spent
differentiating metallic object from a mine. Although most of the mines are metallic [73;74],
we can see that the cost of detecting a mine and a non-metallic object are similar because we
require a prediction of at least 95%. Due to the sensitive nature of the landmine detection
problem, it is important to ensure that even a non-metallic object is not a mine even if we
encounter higher costs. However, despite MD’s high utility (Figure 6.2(b)) and low cost
(Figure 6.3(a)), its error of classifying the object type is the largest, as can be seen from
Figure 6.3(b).
In our next group of experiments we analyze the effect of the total number of sensors
that are available to the decision maker on the utility and the error using our prediction
market-based technique. We keep all the parameters fixed as described in Table 6.3 except
we vary the total number of sensors parameter. We also set the value of belief update weight
wbel = 0.5(used in Equation 6.2) and the object type to be a mine in these experiments.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the average utilities and average RMSE for different types of
sensors. We observe that when there are diverse types of sensors available to the decision
maker, the sensors get higher utility and the RMSE of detecting the object’s type is lower
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Figure 6.4: Average sensors’ utilities in the environment with 5 MD sensors(a), 5 MD
and 1 GPR sensor(b), 5 MD, 1 IR, and 1 GPR sensors(c), 2 MD, 2 IR, and 2 GPR
sensors(d).
than when there are sensors of only one type available. For example, we can see that when
the decision maker has only a total of 5 MD sensors available to it, MD sensors receive
32% less utility than when there are a total of 2 MD, 2 IR, and 2 GPR sensors available
to the decision maker. We posit that this is because the sensors of different types sensor
the environment differently and produce different beliefs. Thus, in the environment where
there are sensors of different types, MD sensors take into account the beliefs of the sensors
of other types through the market price and they are able to update their beliefs to reflect
their private signals and also the beliefs of the sensors of other types. We also note that the
accuracy of predicting object’s type reaches only 80% when there are a total of 5 MD sensors
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Figure 6.5: Average RMSE in the environment with 5 MD sensors(a), 5 MD and
1 GPR sensor(b), 5 MD, 1 IR, and 1 GPR sensors(c), 2 MD, 2 IR, and 2 GPR
sensors(d).
available, but it reaches 94% when there are 2 MD, 2 IR, and 2 GPR sensors available. This
is because when there are sensors of different types in the environment there is more diverse
information available to the sensors, and also the decision maker has more opportunities to
make better decisions.
Compared Techniques. For comparing the performance of our prediction market
based object classification techniques, we have used two other well-known techniques for in-
formation fusion: (a) Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory for landmine classification [73], where a
two-level approach based on belief functions is used. At the first level, the detected object is
classified according to its metal content. At the second level the chosen level of metal content
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is further analyzed to classify the object as a landmine or a friendly object. The belief up-
date of the sensors that we used for D-S method is the same one we have described in Section
6.1.1. (b) Distributed Data Fusion (DDF) [70], where sensor measurements are refined over
successive observations using a temporal, Bayesian inference-based, information filter. To
compare DDF with our prediction market-based technique, we replaced our belief aggrega-
tion mechanism given in Equation 6.7 with a DDF-based information filter. We compare our
techniques using some standard evaluation metrics from multi-sensor information fusion [80]:
root mean squared error (RMSE) defined as in Section 6.1, normed mean squared errors


























Θˆt was calculated using D-S, DDF, and our prediction market technique (Θˆt = Bt).



























































Figure 6.6: Comparison of our Prediction Market-based information aggregation with
Dempster-Shafer and Distributed Data Fusion Techniques using different metrics:
RMSE(a), NMSE(b), Information gain(c).
In Table 6.6, we show how the decision maker’s decisions using our prediction market
technique results in the deployment of different numbers and types of sensors over the
time window of the object. We report the results for the value of belief update weight
wbel = 0.5(used in Equation 6.2) while using our prediction market model, as well as using
D-S and DDF. We see that non-metallic object classification requires less number of sensors
as both MD and IR sensors can distinguish between metallic vs. non-metallic objects, and
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Object Time PM DDF D-S
type steps
Mine 1 1(1MD) 1(1MD) 1(1MD)
2 3(1MD,1IR) 3(1MD,1GPR) 3(1IR,1GPR)
3 4(1GPR) 5(1MD,1IR) 4(1MD)
4 5(1MD) 6(1IR) 5(1MD)
5 6(1MD) 7(1MD) 6(1IR)
6 7(1IR) 8(1MD) 7(1IR)
7 - 9(1IR) 8(1MD)
Metallic 1 1(1MD) 1(1MD) 1(1MD)
or 2 3(1MD,1IR) 4(1MD,1IR,1GPR) 3(1IR,1GPR)
Friendly 3 4(1GPR) 5(1MD) 4(1MD)
for D-S 4 5(1MD) 6(1IR) 5(1IR)
5 6(1IR) 7(1MD) 6(1IR)
6 7(1MD) 8(1IR) 7(1MD)
7 8(1IR) 9(1GPR) 8(1MD)
8 - 9(1MD) 8(1MD)
Non- 1 1(1MD) 1(1MD)






Table 6.6: Different number of sensors and the sensor types deployed over time by a
decision maker to classify different types of objects.
so, deploying just these two types of sensors can help to infer that the object is not a mine.
In contrast, metallic objects require more time to get classified as not being a mine because
more object features using all three sensor types need to be observed. We also observe
that on average our aggregation technique using prediction market deploys a total of 6− 8
sensors and detects the object type with at least 95% accuracy in 6−7 time steps, while the
next best compared DDF technique deploys a total of 7− 9 sensors and detects the object
type with at least 95% accuracy in 7− 8 time steps.
Our results shown in Figure 6.6(a) illustrate that the RMSE using our PM-based tech-
nique is below the RMSEs using D-S and DDF by an average of 8% and 5% respectively.
Figure 6.6(b) shows that the NMSE values using our PM-based technique is 18% and 23%
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Contr. Research Question Research Findings
4 How can prediction markets - With the design of the payment
be used for decision function that incentivizes truthful
making? revelation.
4 Is there an advantage of - Our results showed that PM-based
using prediction markets technique for sensor fusion results
for sensor fusion? in more accurate results than
existing methods.
4 Can a prediction market-based - Our simulation results show good
model for sensor fusion be results for a realistic scenario
effective in realistic settings in a sensor fusion setting.
given various limitations?
Table 6.7: Research findings for research questions in contribution 4 of this thesis.
less on average than D-S and DDF techniques respectively. Finally, in Figure 6.6(c) we
observe that the information gain for our PM-based technique is 12% and 17% more than
D-S and DDF methods respectively.
In summary, in this chapter of the thesis we described a sensor information aggregation
technique for object classification with a multi-agent prediction market and developed a
payment function used by the market maker to incentivize truthful revelation by each
agent. Our experimental results verify that, for identical data distributions and settings,
using our prediction market-based information aggregation technique increases the accuracy
of object classification favorably as compared to two other commonly used techniques. The
work presented in this part of the thesis was published in [57] and [58] and the overview of




Games for Distributed Prediction
Markets
In the last part of this thesis we investigate a setting of several prediction markets
that are able to interact and influence each other’s aggregated market prices, and thus the
predictions about the outcome of future events. We call such setting distributed prediction
markets. Contrary to single prediction markets with confined traders, there are several
real-life instances where multiple prediction markets running simultaneously have similar
events. For example, both Intrade and Iowa Electronic Market ran prediction markets on
several events related to the 2012 U.S. Presidential elections. With such similar events across
markets, it is very likely that the expected outcomes (prices) of an event in one market will
influence the price of the same or similar event in a different market. There are several ways
in which prediction markets can influence each other. For example, traders participating in
prediction markets, just like in financial markets, are not locked in one prediction market;
they can trade in other markets. In such case, the market participants’ trading decisions
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maybe affected by their involvement in other related markets. Also, traders can observe the
fluctuations in the market prices of all related prediction markets, and thus their trading
decisions maybe influenced by that information. Such inter-market influence is frequently
observed in financial markets, which operate very similarly to prediction markets. For
example, after analyzing the data from the retail online brokerage, called eToro, Pan et al.
reported that the prices of securities in one market affect the prices of similar securities
in other markets and that social trading (when traders can see each others’ trades) results
in higher profits to the traders [88]. Financial market traders also tend to exhibit herding
behavior [3], where a trader tends to have the same beliefs as the majority of the traders in
its neighborhood. For example, a trader is more prone to riskier behavior (e.g., overreacting
to small price changes) when its peer traders exhibit risky behavior. Since a market maker
in a prediction market can be viewed as type of trader, they can also influence each other
in the similar manner. Therefore, it is important to consider the global setting, where the
aggregated market price in one prediction market is not only affected by the traders in that
market, but also by the expected outcome of similar events in other prediction markets.
Furthermore, we envisage that by taking into account the aggregated information of other
prediction markets, the aggregation of each prediction market can be improved. In this
chapter we attempt to make a first step into the study of distributed prediction markets
by investigating the effects of events across multiple prediction markets and analyze how
prices evolve due to such inter-market effects.
The main contributions made by this part of the thesis towards studying this problem
are the following: we describe a model of a distributed prediction market that comprises
multiple, parallel running prediction markets and uses a graphical structure between the
market makers of the different markets to represent inter-market influence. We then propose
a formal framework based on graphical games [64] called a Weighted Bayesian Graphical
Game (WBGG) to capture the interaction between multiple market makers and describe
an algorithm based on NashProp [79] to calculate an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium
efficiently for an n-agent WBGG. Finally, we conduct a number of experiments to analyze
the effect of different parameters in distributed prediction markets, and we find that when
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the size of the neighborhood is too small or too large, agents’ utilities decrease, and, that
agents using our algorithm in a distributed prediction market setting can outperform the
agents using a greedy strategy or the agents in the setting where prediction markets are
disjoint. To the best of our knowledge, this work represents the first attempt at studying
inter-market influences between similar events across multiple prediction markets through
strategic decision making by market makers. The research questions that we try to answer
in this contribution are reproduced below in Table 7.1.
Contr. Research Question Research Approach
5 How can we design a distributed Theoretical Examination
model of a prediction market Design and Development
to be used for decision making?
5 Is our distributed model of the prediction Theoretical Examination
market incentive compatible?
5 How does a distributed information Theoretical Examination
aggregation in a prediction market Empirical Analysis
compare to the centralized aggregation?
Table 7.1: Research questions that are addressed in contribution 5 of this thesis.
7.1 Distributed Prediction Markets
In this section we define and characterize distributed prediction markets. We consider n
prediction markets with each prediction market having one market maker that is responsible
for aggregating traders’ beliefs and setting the market price for its market. The events
across the prediction markets can be correlated and the market makers can interact with
each other if their prediction markets are running correlated events. Let N = {1, ..., n}
denote the set of market makers with i being the market maker for the i-th prediction
market. Let Γ = {Γ1, ...,Γn} denote a set of trading agents with Γi being the set of trading
agents in the i-th prediction market. Note that trading agents can participate in multiple
prediction markets simultaneously, i.e., Γi
⋂
Γj 6= ∅. Also let E = {E1, ..., En} denote the
set of events across all the prediction markets with Ei representing the set of events in the
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i-th prediction market∗. Finally, let P denote the trader population.
Next, we present two axioms that outline the behavior of market makers in the dis-
tributed prediction market setting. Consider two market makers i and j running events efi
and egj in their respective prediction markets. Let dfi,gj be a distance metric that measures
the similarity between the definitions of the two events efi and egj
†.
Definition 3. Related Event. An event efi is related to event egj if dfi,gj > ǫsim, where
ǫsim is a constant.
We denote the number of market makers that market maker i interacts with by ηi and
the influence of the market maker i on market maker j by ̟ij .
Axiom 1. Local interaction, Influence, Competition: If events efi and egj run by
market makers i and j correspondingly are related, then (1) market maker i interacts with
market maker j for determining the price of event efi , (2) 0 < ̟i,j < 1, and (3) market
makers i and j are competitive.
The first part of Axiom 1 determines the criterion for interaction between two market
makers. Market maker i interacts with another market maker j for updating event efi ’s
price, only if j’s market has an event that is related to event efi . The second part of Axiom
1 states that two market makers that have a pair of related events in their market have a
non-zero, positive influence on each other. Influence values are normalized to a range of 0
and 1. In a prediction market a market maker needs to be able to calculate the market price
(aggregate) and to stimulate the trading by always allowing traders to buy or sell securities.
If there are prediction markets with similar events, the traders may choose one prediction
market over the other, and market makers may end up competing over the traders just like
in financial markets [61]. The third part of Axiom 1 summarizes this competitive behavior
between market makers.
∗For legibility, we refer to the security corresponding to an event as the event itself.
†We assume that dfi,gj is based on the similarity between the textural description of the events
efi and egi and is provided externally to the market makers either by a human expert or by an
automated program.
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Axiom 2. Incentives: Let θi be the private information of market maker i denoted as
i’s type. Let ui(θi) be the utility that the market maker i gets for interacting with other






Finally, because market makers are competing with each other to attract traders on
related events, a market maker may have incentives to misreport its inside information about
aggregated prices when interacting with other market makers. In other words, market-


































Figure 7.1: Example of the distributed prediction markets with 6 market makers
a1, ..., a6.
Definition 4. Distributed prediction market. A distributed prediction market is spec-
ified by the tuple M = 〈N,P,E,W〉 where N,P,E are as defined before and W = {̟ij :
i, j ∈ N}.
Figure 7.1 shows a diagram of a distributed prediction market with 6 market makers
a1, ..., a6, and corresponding trader populations P1, ..., P6. ηi denotes the number of agents
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ai interacts with. For the simplicity of the analysis in the rest of the chapter we assume
the setting where multiple market makers interact over one related event; but the results
are valid for multiple events. Since the decision making for inter-market influence is done
mainly by market makers, we abstract the operation of the trading agents and assume that
the intra-market price of each prediction market is updated by the market maker’s actions
in the locality of the current market price. Nevertheless, our proposed technique can be
combined easily with any other intra-market price update method such market scoring rules.
Since we are not focussing on the interactions of trading agents, we refer to market makers
as agents in the rest of the chapter.
7.1.1 Graphical Games for Distributed Prediction Markets
We propose a form of graphical games [64;79;100] as a formal model for the interaction between
market makers in a distributed prediction market. Graphical games are a compact repre-
sentation of complete information, one-shot, normal-form games that use graphical models
to represent the set of agents whose actions influence each others’ payoffs. A graphical game
representation is appropriate for modeling distributed prediction markets because they can
capture the interactions and influences between agents that are within a certain local neigh-
borhood of each other, unlike for example conventional Bayesian games. A graphical game
is described by an undirected graph G in which agents are identified with nodes, and the
edge between two nodes implies that the payoff of each of the two agents is dependent on
the other agent’s actions. Every graphical game has a Nash equilibrium and every game
can be represented as a graphical game by letting the game to be the complete graph.
Representation of graphical games is O(n2k) with k = maxiηi ≪ n, i.e. it is exponential in
the maximum degree of any node in the graph in comparison to normal form games which
representation is O(n2n), i.e. exponential in the number of agents [64;79].
The original work by Kearns et al. [64] considered acyclic graphical games of complete
information in which the underlying graph is a tree and presented a message-passing algo-
rithm, known as TreeProp or KLS algorithm, for computing approximate Nash equilibria
(NE) efficiently. The main idea of their algorithm is to view the game as being composed
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of several interacting local games and to exploit this locality by iteratively computing local
equilibria and combining them together to obtain global equilibria efficiently. Consequently,
in [79] the authors generalized the TreeProp algorithm to an arbitrary graph structure by
proposing a message-passing NashProp algorithm for complete information games which
involves an approach analogous to loopy belief propagation in graphical games. In other
work, Vickrey and Koller [104] presented multi-agent algorithms for solving graphical games
including hill-climbing, constraint satisfaction, and hybrid approaches. In [100] the authors
studied the graphical games with incomplete information with discrete and continuous types
and propose an extension to KLS algorithm to find Bayes-Nash equilibrium efficiently in a
tree structured graphical game. In games of incomplete information, the payoff to an agent
depends not only on the actions of the other agents but also on its own private type. Games
represented as sparsely connected graphs can be commonly be seen in various settings, for
example social networks, business relationships, financial markets, ad hoc networks of mo-
bile devices, etc. Kearns [63] has also argued that graphical games provide computational,
structural and interdisciplinary advantages as well.
We present an augmented form of the conventional graphical game to represent dis-
tributed prediction markets, called a Weighted Bayesian Graphical Game (WBGG). Unlike
previous works on graphical games, WBGG incorporates incomplete information, the influ-
ence of agents on each other as a pair of directed edges, and an arbitrary graphical structure
in one representation. We define a WBGG as follows:
Definition 5. A WBGG is a tuple (N,Θ, p,Ξ,W, A, u), where
- N = {1, ..., n} - set of market maker agents.
- Θ = Θ1 × ...×Θn, where Θi is the type space of agent i.
- p : Θ→ [0, 1] is the common prior over types.
- Ξ = {Ξ1, ...,Ξn} - set of directed edges, where Ξi = {ξij |ξij = (i, j), i, j ∈ N} with ξij
being an edge between agents i and j that are able to interact.
125
- W - set of edge weights, where ̟ij ∈ W is the weight of the edge ξij between agents
i and j. ̟ij is determined by agent i and indicates the influence of agent i on agent
j. Given agent i’s type is θiopt, ̟ij is calculated as:
̟ij = αp(θjopt|θiopt) + (1− α)p(θjpes|θiopt), (7.1)
where θiopt ∈ Θi, θjopt, θjpes ∈ Θj and α is a confidence parameter representing i’s
belief that j is of the same type as itself.
- A = A1 × ...×An, where Ai is a finite set of actions available to agent i.
- ui : Θi∈N ×Ai∈N × T → R is the utility of agent i.
We assume that a set of similar events in a distributed prediction market have a duration
of T periods with t denoting the current time period. The agents that are able to interact
and therefore influence each other’s utilities define a neighborhood N, where N−i = {j|j ∈
N−i, ξij ∈ Ξi} and Ni = N−i ∪ {i}. We also assume that each agent can be one of two
possible types, i.e. if Θi is the type space of market maker agent i then Θi = {θiopt, θipes}
with θiopt implying that agent i is an optimistic market maker agent and θipes implying that
it is a pessimistic market maker agent.
Following Bayesian games [76] we use si(θiopt) to denote agent i’s mixed strategy over
Ai given its type is θiopt. Si is the set of all i’s mixed strategies. We use notation si for
unconditional mixed strategy of agent i. We use ANi , sNi , θNi to denote the vector of actions,
strategies and types of all agents in the neighborhood of agent i, ̟N−i denote the vector of
weights between agent i and all agents in the neighborhood of agent i, ai, si, θi to denote
the action, strategy and type of agent i, and AN−i , sN−i , θN−i to denote actions, strategies
and types of all agents in the neighborhood of agent i except agent i itself.
Agent action set and utility function. For specifying the actions in agent i’s action
set Ai, we assume that agent i can have two possible actions in Ai - to raise the current
market price or to lower it by a certain amount that is specified by a jump parameter λti,
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, where πti ∈ (ζ, 1] is the market price at time step t,
with ζ being a small positive constant corresponding to a very nominal price change, and
δti is a constant that determines the direction (up or down) of the price change
∗. The value
of δti is determined by agent i depending on its type and by observing the direction of the











+ζ if ∀j ∈ N−i, πtj − π
t−1
j ≥ 0,
−ζ if ∃j s.t. πtj − π
t−1
j < 0
If agent i is optimistic, it sets δti = +ζ if the average change in the market price of its
neighbors in the last time step has been non-negative, otherwise it sets δti = −ζi. Similarly,
if agent i is pessimistic, it sets δti = +ζi only if all of its neighbors increased their prices in
the last time step but sets δti = −ζi if at least one of its neighbors decreased its prices in
the last time step. †
The utility of agent i is calculated as:
uti(λi) = (T − t)e
−λi(T−t), (7.2)
where t is the current time period (t = 0 at the start of the market). The above utility
equation guarantees that the utility of changing the market price (by taking an action in the
WBGG) is proportional to the remaining duration of the event in the market, and, more
exploration (large price changes) gives higher utility towards the beginning of the event,
but as the event nears its end and its price converges, large explorations are punished with
lower utility.
∗If πi crosses either its lower or upper bound due to action Ai, we set it back to its lower or
upper bound correspondingly.
†We drop superscript t from λti, δ
t
i , and π
t
i henceforth, assuming it to be understood from the
context.
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Next, we define the agent’s expected utility in a weighted Bayesian graphical game as









j∈N−i ̟j . Note that agent i has to consider every assignment of types to
the other agents in its neighborhood θN−i and every action profile aNi in order to calculate
the utility ui(aNi , θN−i , θi).
Definition 6. For agent i a strategy si is said to be best response (BR) in a WBGG for
type θi to θNi , if
∀s′, EU(si, sN−i , θi) ≥ EU(s
′, sN−i , θi) (7.4)
Definition 7. A strategy vector s is a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in a WBGG if
and only if every agent i is playing a best response to the others.
7.1.2 Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
In this section we first present an abstract algorithm for computing BNE in a weighted
Bayesian graphical game of an arbitrary graphical structure. This algorithm is similar
to NashProp algorithm [79] that has been extended to incomplete games with an arbitrary
graphical structure, thus the definition of the expected utility and the best response have
been modified.
For now, we will not purposefully specify a certain representation and a certain im-
plementation. After proving the correctness of the abstract algorithm, we will fill in the
unspecified gaps. The abstract algorithm is basically a two-stage message passing algo-
rithm. In the first step, local optimal response is found for each agent, where each agent
calculates the optimal strategy given its neighbor’s strategies and sends it to its neighbors.
In the second step, global solution is constructed by eliminating inconsistent local optimal
response.
Let Di,j be the binary table indexed by all possible strategies of agent i and agent j
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that is sent from agent j to agent i. Let Nj−i = (1, ...,m − 1) denote the neighbors of




= (s1, ..., sm−1) be the vector of mixed strategies of
agents in Nj−i, called the witness to Di,j. Also let Pj be the projection set used to combine
information sent to agent j by its neighbors.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 3 computes BNE for an arbitrary graphical game and the tables
and witnesses calculated by it contain all possible BNE of the game.
Proof. The proof is a constructive argument of the workings of the algorithm. The stage 1
starts with an arbitrary node. Each node(agent) i sends each of its neighbors j a binary-
valued table Dj,i indexed by all possible strategies of agents j and i. For any pair of
strategies (sj, si) a table Dj,i is 1 if and only if there exists a BNE in which agent i plays
si when its neighboring agent j plays sj.
Consider a node i with neighbors j and Nj−i = {1, ...,m − 1}. For induction, assume
that each h sends node i table Di,h. For any pair of strategies (sj , si) a table Dj,i is 1 if and




= {s1, ..., sm−1} (witness) for N
j
−i such that:
1. Di,h(si, sh) = 1 ∀1 ≤ h ≤ m, and
2. si is the best-response to sh and sj.
There maybe more than one witness for Dj,i(sj, si) = 1. In addition to computing the
binary-valued tables (i.e. Dj,i), stage 1 of the algorithm also saves a list of witnesses for
each pair of strategies (sj, si) for which the table (Dj,i) is 1.
Now assume that Dj,i = 1 for some node i with neighbors j and N
j





. By construction, Di,h(si, sh) = 1 ∀h, and therefore by induction it must be that there
exists BNE in which h plays sh given that node i plays si and by construction of Dj,i si is
a best response of agent i and must be a part of BNE given that agent j plays sj.
Stage 1 converges because all tables begin filled with 1 entries and entries can only
change from 0 to 1, [79].
Stage 2 is a backtracking local assignment passing stage. It starts at an arbitrary node
j which can chose any sj for which P (sj) = 1 and any witness sNj
−i
from the associated
witness list. The node j then passes (sj, sh) to each its neighbors h telling h to play sh.
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Approximate-findBNE( )
Input: Game specification, ǫ approximation parameter, duration T
Output: ǫ-BNE of the game
Set t = 0; // initialize the prediction market’s time period
Set r = 0; // initialize the round for the first stage
Set D0j,i(si, sj) = 1 ∀si, sj , ∀i, j; // initialize the table, where agent i and agent j are the
neighbors
foreach time period t ≤ T do
Stage 1 : Local Optima
while not converged do
foreach agent pair i, j do
foreach si, sj do
if Dr(sj , sh) = 1 ∀h AND sj is Best Response to sNj
−i
and si then





as a witness to Dr+1(si, sj) = 1;
end
else
Dr(sj , sh) = 0 ∀h;
end
end
send Dr+1 to all of its neighbors;
end
r = r + 1 ;
end
Stage 2 : Global Optima













// construct BNE - local search
1. Pick any agent j and any sj s.t. P (sj) = 1 with witness sNj
−i
;
2. Agent j assigns itself sj and each of its neighbors h it assigns sh;
3. Pick next node and assign of all its unassigned neighbors with its witness;





Algorithm 3: Algorithm to find BNE in a WBGG.
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From the semantics of this message passing and backtracking step if sj turns out to not be
the best response when all of j’s neighbors are assigned strategies, it must be true that sj
is the best response to its neighbors for any node j.
7.1.3 Computing approximate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
Algorithm 3 is incompletely specified because the representation and computation of the
step of passing tables in stage 1 is not completely specified. Since the strategy for an agent
is a mapping from types to the simplex of probability distributions over actions, it may
not be possible to represent tables D compactly or finitely for an arbitrary graphical game.
We now present an algorithm for computing approximate BNE in incomplete information
general structured graphical games with discrete types.
We adopt our abstract algorithm to compute ǫ-BNE in graphical games of an arbitrary
structure with discrete types. Our updated algorithm takes parameter ǫ as input, that
specifies how close of an approximation to BNE we want to get. The strategy space is
discretized analogous to [64], such that any agent can only choose actions with probabilities
that are multiples of τ , for some τ , instead of playing an arbitrary mixed strategy in
[0, 1]. For a graphical games that contains l actions the probability that each action will be





Input: Game specification and ǫ approximation parameter Output: ǫ-BNE of
the game
Run Algorithm 3 with two changes:
1. Only consider type-conditional discretized strategies
2. Change the requirement of best response to ǫ-best response.
Algorithm 4: Approximation algorithm to find BNE in a weighted graphical game.
Theorem 4. For any ǫ > 0, k = maxiηi ≪ n, and the discretization parameter τ ≤
ǫ
lk(4klog(k))
Algorithm 4 computes ǫ-BNE for an arbitrarily structured graphical game with
incomplete information.
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Proof. In [100] it was shown that if the mixed strategy space for every type is restricted to
multiples of τ , then for any ǫ and τ ≤ ǫ
lk(4klog(k))
there exists ǫ-BNE in tree structured
graphical games. Their result however does not depend on the underlying graph being a
tree, and therefore holds for arbitrary graphs also. The witness lists and tables of Algorithm
4 represent all ǫ-BNE. Therefore, Algorithm 4 is guaranteed to converge to an ǫ-BNE.
Theorem 5. For arbitrary structured graphical games with discrete types stage 1 in Algo-
rithm 4 converges in at most nk
τ4(l−1)
rounds.
Proof. The total number of entries in each table D is O( 1
τ2∗2(l−1)
) since the number of
entries is determined by the number of joint strategies of two agents with two possible
types. Every round r before the algorithm converges has to change at least one entry in
one table. Therefore, stage 1 of the Algorithm 4 has to converge in at most nk
τ4(l−1)
rounds,
where k is the maximum degree of any node in the graph.
Since our work in this chapter extends the existing NashProp algorithm, we don’t ex-
pect scalability and complexity to be significantly different from [79]. Instead we report the
dynamics in market maker’s prices and utilities which demonstrate the behavior, important
features and successful operation of our model in a distributed prediction markets setting.
Proposition 4. Algorithm 4 applied to a distributed prediction market problem that uses
utility function given in Equation 7.2 encourages truthful revelation.
Proof. For the simplicity of notation we show the proof for two agents i and j, with two
possible types θiopt and θipes, but the proof is extendable to multiple agents with several
possible types. We want to show that the expected utility that the agent i gets when
choosing action Atruei truthfully is greater or equal to the expected utility it gets when it




i . Since there are only two possible actions
Ai = {λi,−λi}, misreporting would mean that when Algorithm 1 recommends agent i to




i . From definition of
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Name Symbol Value
Number of market makers N 20
Market price’s jump scaling parm. ζ 0.01
Confidence that other market maker α 0.5
is of the same type
Prob. distr. over types p U [0, 1]
Discretization parameter τ 0.3
Approximation value ǫ 0.05
Number of actions li∀i 2
Number of neighbors ηi∀i 8
Table 7.2: Parameters used for our simulation experiments.
utility given in Equation 7.2 we can express the utility as ui(λi) = (T − t)e
−|Ai|(T−t). Now,

























Since |Atruei | = | − A
true




i . Therefore, agent i does not have any
incentive to reveal its action untruthfully.
7.2 Experimental Results
We conduct several simulations using our algorithm for a distributed prediction market
setting to observe and verify the effect of different parameters on the evolution of market
maker utilities and prices in the markets. To make it easier to analyze the effect of different
parameters, in all of our simulations we assume that the number of neighbors is fixed for
each market maker. For each experiment we vary one set of parameters as specified in each
set of experiments and we hold the other parameters fixed at their default values given in
Table 7.2.
For our first set of experiments, we vary p, the probability distribution over types.
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θi = optimistic, ∀ i
θi = pessimistic, ∀ i
a b
Figure 7.2: The average cumulative utility(a) and the average market price(b) for
different types of market makers.
We allow for three types of market maker populations: mostly pessimistic, equal number
of optimistic and pessimistic, and optimistic. Figure 7.2(a) shows the cumulative utility
averaged over all 20 market makers, where the market maker population is either 80%
pessimistic, 50% pessimistic and 50% optimistic, and 80% optimistic. The type of each
market maker is determined at the beginning of the prediction market and it does not
change over time. We observe that when the majority of market makers is pessimistic the
average utility is 23% less than when the majority of market makers is optimistic. This is
because optimistic market makers’ strategy selection is affected by the average strategies
of their neighbors, whereas pessimistic market makers’ strategy selection is affected by
just one other market maker choosing a pessimistic strategy. In Figure 7.2(b) we continue
analyzing the effect of different market makers’ types by looking at the average market
price produced by the optimistic and the pessimistic market makers for the outcome of the
event that happens (market price = 1). We note that optimistic market makers are able
to predict a more accurate market price as opposed to the pessimistic ones. Again, this is
due to the optimistic market makers taking into account the average strategies of all the
market makers in their neighborhood. However, in real prediction market, there may be
a mix of different types of market makers. Therefore, for the default setting for the type
distribution we assume that there is about the same number of optimistic market makers
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as pessimistic ones.

















































Figure 7.3: The average cumulative utility(a) and the market price(b) of one market
maker using Algorithm 4, Greedy, or Influence-less markets strategies.
Next, we compare our Algorithm 4 to two other strategies:
• Greedy strategy: In this setting, each agent i chooses λi that maximizes immediate
utility given in Equation 7.2. This strategy does not consider the types of the market
makers.
• Influence-less markets: In this setting, we consider conventional single, isolated
markets where the market price is determined by the market maker based on that
market’s traders’ decisions only. This setting is the completely opposite scenario of a
distributed prediction market and it captures the effect of inter-market influences on
the market makers’ utilities and prices. To abstract the details of the traders’ deci-
sions, we have assumed that each agent i uses a derivative follower (DF) [40] strategy
where it keeps on increasing its market price πi by δi until its immediate utility ui
starts decreasing, at that time agent i starts decreasing πi by δi. This strategy does
not consider the types or the interaction among market makers.
Figures 7.3 (a) and (b) show the utilities and market prices for the market makers using
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our proposed algorithm, greedy strategy, or influence-less markets strategy correspondingly.
We observe that market makers using our Algorithm 4 obtain 56% more utility than the
market makers following the next best greedy strategy. We also note that market prices
fluctuate more when market makers use a greedy strategy or are in influence-less markets
than when they use WBGG because greedy and influence-less market strategies are myopic
and do not consider market makers’ types. Finally, this result provides an important justi-
fication of our work in this part of the thesis - that, as compared to influence-less markets
with isolated market makers, interacting market makers in a distributed prediction market
are able to improve their utilities and predict prices with less fluctuations.
For our next set of experiments we analyze the effect of the α parameter which is used
in Equation 7.1. This parameter is the confidence parameter representing market maker
agent i’s belief that the other market maker in its neighborhood is of the same type as
itself. We assume that α is the same for all of market maker agent i’s neighbors and it
is set at the beginning of the market. We can see from Figure 7.4(a) that for the setting
where the market makers are of mixed types (about half is pessimistic and the other half
is optimistic), the market makers get the highest utility when α = 0.5. However, when
market makers are confident that all of their neighbors are either of the opposite type or of
the same type, they get 32% − 33% less utility correspondingly.
Finally, we report the results for different number of market makers and different number
of neighbors of each market maker. Figure 7.4(b) shows the cumulative utility averaged over
neighboring market makers for a setting with 20 market makers. We can see that when
market makers have a small number of neighbors then they get less utility than when the
number of neighbors is larger, up to a certain point. For example, market makers with
2 neighbors (10% of the total number of market makers) get 29% less utility than when
market makers have 8 neighbors (40% of the total number of market makers). However,
this relationship is not linear, i.e. when market makers have 12 neighbors (60% of the
total number of market makers) they get 19% less utility than when market makers have
8 neighbors. We posit that increasing the number of neighbors up to a point translates
to an increased utility because the market maker can improve its decision based on the
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num neighbors = 12
num neighbors = 8
num neighbors = 2
num neighbors = 5
a b
Figure 7.4: The average cumulative utility for different values of α(a), the cumulative
utility averaged over all neighbors for different number of neighbors, i.e. 2, 5, 8, and
12(b).
information of its neighbors, but having too many neighbors may end up creating more
noisy information for the market maker.
We also conduct experiments showing the scalability of our Algorithm 4 with respect
to the number of market makers, and our results show that our algorithm scales linearly
with the number of market makers and that the running time increases with the increased
number of neighbors.
In summary, in this chapter we proposed a novel distributed prediction markets setting
where the aggregated (market) price of a security of an event in one prediction market is
affected dynamically by the prices of securities of similar events in other, simultaneously
running prediction markets. Our proposed formal framework, called a weighted Bayesian
graphical game (WBGG), is able to capture the local interactions between multiple market
makers and uses the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept to find a suitable action for each
market maker in WBGG. Our experimental results showed our algorithm results in higher
utilities and more accurate prices in comparison to a greedy strategy or a disjoint prediction
markets. The work presented in this part of the thesis was published in [59] and the overview
of our findings is shown in Table 7.3.
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Contr. Research Question Research Findings
5 How can we design a distributed - We use a model based on a
model of a prediction market graphical game that allows
to be used for decision making? to model interactions of
multiple prediction markets.
5 Is our distributed model of the - We prove that our model
prediction market encourages truthful revelation.
incentive-compatible?
5 How does a distributed - Our experiments show that market
information aggregation in a makers get higher utilities and
prediction market compare achieve better accuracy in a
to the centralized aggregation? distributed setting.




This thesis makes significant contributions to an analysis of prediction markets using a multi-
agent system, game theory, and Boolean network-based tools and to using the generated
knowledge for the design of information aggregation systems that can be used for decision
making and in a distributed scenarios. In this chapter we summarize our contributions
and identify future directions for our research. We also identify general open problems in
prediction markets.
8.1 Lessons Learned and Future Directions
This thesis makes five distinct contributions, which are summarized below along with future
research directions for each contribution:
1. The first contribution is a multi-agent system that is used to analyze the effect of
information on the prediction market performance. It helps answering the ques-
tion of how the changes in different aspects of information affect the performance
of prediction markets. Our research showed that incorporating information related
parameters into prediction market models can give insights into realistic aspects of
prediction market’s performance. For example, we verified that when information
arrives more frequently prices fluctuate less and utilities increase, when information
is more reliable prices are more stable and utilities are higher, and when information
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is easily available prices are driven down and utilities are higher. A direction worth
future investigation is how to incorporate psychological and sociological data about
humans’ beliefs and their private information. A possible way to address this issue is
to run a controlled real prediction market experiment to obtain human trader’s data,
and then use this data to further test the effect of information on prediction markets.
We are also interested in introducing and investigating correlations between events
in a prediction market.
2. The second contribution is a correlated equilibrium strategy for the traders within a
partially observable stochastic game-based model that incentivizes traders to reveal
their true beliefs and allows them to achieve higher payoffs than existing trading
strategies. This study uses the real data to compare the performance of the multi-
agent system based prediction market to the real prediction markets. From this
contribution we learned that accounting for the uncertainty of the environment leads
to a more precise prediction market model. We observed that game-theoretic corre-
lated equilibrium strategy improves the accuracy of the market prices and the utility
of the trading agents. Also, while using real data we were able to show that trading
agents using correlated equilibrium trading strategy can avoid inefficient human trad-
ing decisions that might result in a very large loss. Our work uses the Logarithmic
Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) to calculate the market price. However, LMSR has
been recently shown to have some drawbacks, for example, the market maker can
run at a loss which can be large and a single parameter b controls the loss bound,
the level of liquidity, and the rate of adaptability to market shocks [83]. Also, in our
work, we used the correlated equilibrium to determine the traders’ or agents’ selected
strategies. Although the CE finds a stable strategy for each agent, that strategy may
not satisfy certain desirable properties such as maximizing the joint utility received
by the agents. Besides, the CE strategy also relies on a third party, the market-maker
in the prediction market, to calculate the probabilities with which the agents could
play different strategies. An alternate solution concept to the CE that could guar-
antee desirable properties such as maximizing joint utilities to agents, guaranteeing
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a minimum utility to each agent, etc., and reducing or removing the reliance on the
market maker to calculate the CE would be worth future investigation. Another
future direction worthy of investigation is to incorporate liquidity-sensitive market-
maker that has been proposed very recently [87] for aggregating the traders’ or agents’
information. We also plan to study a technique for choosing the best equilibrium
efficiently, as it currently lies outside of the scope of this project.
3. The third contribution is a study of the dynamics of prediction markets under various
conditions using Boolean Network techniques. The results of this study show how
various market parameters affect the prediction market’s behavior. An interesting
lesson that we learned from this study is that using simple boolean rules to model
belief update of the traders does not negatively affect the quality of the aggregated
market price. We also observed that the market price can stabilize with the presence
of noise and also with increasing number of traders. In this work we assumed the
simple synchronous information transmission since our goal was to study the overall
dynamics of the market. Future directions to extensively study this aspect include
incorporating asynchronous information transmission that can be applied in a deter-
ministic or stochastic way and studying different belief update strategies based on
game theory.
4. The fourth contribution is a system that uses prediction markets for decision making.
This system is applied to sensor fusion domain and is tested in the landmine detection
scenario. In this study we showed that a special payment function can be used to
incentivize the sensor agents to report their observations truthfully. We also observed
that having different types of sensors participate in a simulated prediction market can
lead to better decision making and improve object type identification accuracy. Future
directions to extend our model could be to implement the proposed techniques on
physical robotic and sensor systems, minimizing the detection time while guaranteeing
the most accurate detection, integrating the decision making problem and scheduling
problem facing the decision maker, and achieving budget balance in our proposed
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mechanism.
5. The fifth contribution is a distributed-computational model of a decentralized infor-
mation aggregation between multiple prediction markets that are able to interact and
affect each other’s aggregated market prices. This study not only models important
and realistic distributed prediction markets scenario, but also provides an algorithm to
be used by agents in the distributed prediction market scenario that outperforms the
greedy strategy and the agents in the setting where prediction markets are disjoint.
In this contribution we found that prediction markets that are running similar events
can affect each other’s aggregated market prices. We learned that the game-theoretic
Bayes-Nash based algorithm improves the accuracy of the prediction markets and
also provides higher utilities to the traders in such inter-markets in comparison with
disjoint prediction markets. While our model studies the interaction among multi-
ple market makers, it implicitly incorporates influences between traders in multiple
prediction markets through the market maker’s prices. In the future, we plan to ex-
tend our framework to incorporate traders across different prediction markets. We
also plan to extend our algorithm for distributed prediction markets setting to study
stochastic graphical games which can model uncertainty as well as some repeated
games.
8.2 Open Problems
We finally conclude with some more general open problems that are worthy of investigation
to get a better understanding of prediction markets. Market scoring rules and automated
market makers in prediction markets have specifically generated a lot of research in the
past few years. However, there are still many computational challenges in using automated
market makers, especially in combinatorial prediction markets. There has also been a
lot of recent progress made in the direction of analyzing agents’ behaviors in prediction
markets, with one of the biggest research concentrations being on incentive compatibility
and manipulation. However, the full impact of these aspects can be understood with more
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work on non-myopic and non-risk-neutral agent behavior. There are a lot of open and
interesting problems to be solved in using prediction markets for decision making, especially
in generating incentive-compatible decision markets with many agents. Below we present a
few specific open research questions related to prediction markets.
Open Questions:
• Traders:
- What is the minimum number of traders that can guarantee a reasonably accurate
prediction?
- How does group trading affect the accuracy of the aggregated market price?
- What is a suitable strategy for a trading agent to choose its bets in a combinatorial
prediction market that are perhaps subject to constraints or penalties on the number
or complexity of bids?
• Prediction Market:
- What is a suitable model, e.g. filtering, for aggregating traders’ prices under noisy
conditions?
- What are the constraints on accurate predictions (type of market, type of event,
type of trader, etc.) in a prediction market?
- How can the aggregation computation be done in a distributed manner without
using a centralized entity like the market maker?
We envisage that with more research and a better understanding of prediction markets,
they can be used as an effective paradigm to address issues and challenges in several appli-
cations of distributed intelligence. With the recent prominence of large scale data and large
scale networks, prediction markets can be used as an important tool in analyzing “big data”
and in harnessing human knowledge for the purpose of making better decisions. Prediction
markets can also be combined with social networks or sensor networks to create a large
volume market that can be used to aggregate the large volume of data effectively. Finally,
the frameworks and algorithms that we developed in this thesis can be extended beyond
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